





























LCDR. , SC, U. 3. Navy
Bachelor of Arts, 1946
Pennsylvania State University
A thesis submitted to the faculty of the School
of Government, Business and International Affairs
of The George Washington University in partial
satisfaction of the requirements for the degree
of Master of Business Administration.
June 6, 1962
Thesis directed by
Arlin Rex Johnson, Ph.D.,
Professor of Business Administration





GERRY, JOHNNY, STEPHEN and MARK
who live in a




Most people have had occasion to look back on various decisions
affecting their business and personal lives with a mixture of both pleasure
and regret. In both situations it is usually difficult to determine the
real factors which influenced the decisions. While time tends to blur our
recollections of details and we may offer what appear to be creditable reasons
for our behavior, a searching review often reveals that a decision was not
as well considered as it might have been. Frequently our good and bad
choices resulted from a combination of random knowledge and a limited
understanding of consequences.
Observation of many decisions in both business and government has led
to the belief that most decision making can be improved, while this is not
meant to imply that either government or industry has made a high percentage
of poor choices, it has been interesting to observe in retrospect that some
decisions which provided satisfactory results were primarily the result of
chance. Similarly it has been obvious that better choices would have
produced better results.
If the assumption that decision making can be improved is accepted,
the obvious question is how? It is the purpose of this paper to provide an
answer to the question by reviewing some of the past and present contributions
to the process of decision making. In so doing, the process will be discussed
with emphasis on making a decision and only brief reference to the execution
of a decision. Chapter II reviews some of the contributions of philosophy,
iii

psychology, economics and statistics. This is followed in Chapter HI by some
representative decision theories and hypotheses. Decision making methods
are discussed in Chapter IV and group decision making in Chapter V. The new
analytical techniques and theoretical approaches to decision making are
explored in Chapter VI.
The making of better decisions is vital to the efficient allocation
of resources and our survival in today's complex world. Further, making
better decisions as well as more "good" decisions is of universal concern to
every level of management in industry and government.
The preparation of this paper has been a challenging and satisfying
experience. I am deeply indebted to Dr. A. Rex Johnson, not only for helpful
assistance with this paper, but, also, for his able direction of the Navy
Graduate Financial Management which has clarified for me the meaning of the
word ' 'education."
I must also acknowledge my appreciation and thanks to Dr. Richard
Ericson who introduced me to contemporary theories of administration,
organisation and management; to Miss Helen McNulta vfeo offered many helpful
suggestions; to Mrs. W. II. Moore for her typing and editing assistance; and to
my wife, Elaine, who took over the family in true Navy tradition during my
"absence" while working on this paper.
ROBERT G. FABIAN
Lieutenant Commander
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A man has to ignore much to get on with something.
--A. II. 'Whitehead
Decision making has been recognized as one of the most critical
functions of business executives, military officers and politicians. One
author, in discussing the part which decision making plays in management,
treats "decision making" as though it were synonymous with "managing.'
Also many management texts contain references to decision making which state
that it is the heart of managerial activity. The process of decision making
is, however, subject to considerable speculation. Many businessmen frankly
admit that they don't know how they make decisions. Few if any of them
consciously apply rational methodology. Instead they look to knowledge,
previous experience and the exercise of good judgment. At times such
judgment is not far removed from hunches, educated guesses or intuition.
At the other extreme of the decision-making spectrum are the aen analytical
techniques and theoretical approaches. The giant among these is the
computer and the claims for it which include great capabilities for policy
decision making.
-
iHerberc A. Simon, The New Science of Management Decision (New York:
Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1960), p. I.
^Herbert A. Simon and Allen Newell, "Heuristic Problem Solving: The
Next Advance in Operations Research," Operations Research , January-February,
1958, p. 9.

Neither of these extremes, which may be characterized as judgmental
and analytical, constitute the whole of the decision-making process. Rather,
there is a large middleground of conventional theories, concepts and methods
which attempt to make decisions by the methods of science. In varying
degrees they employ logical analysis and careful empirical observation. As
might be expected, the theories and concepts have originated in diverse
fields, each of which has contributed a special point of view.
To set the stage for decision making a definition of the word
"decision" is needed. Most dictionary definitions are only partially
satisfactory in suggesting that "decision" is a settling or terminating or
a conclusion arrived at after consideration. A definition which better
describes the process to be discussed in this paper is:
We shall think of a decision as a course of action chosen by
the decider as the most effective means at his disposal for
achieving the goals or goal he is currently emphasizing - for
solving the problem that is bothering him. Note that a decision
is something quite apart from the actual performance of the act
that has been decided upon; it is a conclusion that a man has
reached as to what he (or others) should do later - sometimes only
a moment later. It is a solution selected after examining several
alternatives - chosen because the decider foresees that the course
of action he elects will do more than the others to further his
goals and will be accompanied by the fewest possible objectionable
consequences . **
Most of the literature does not differentiate decision making from
problem solving. Numerous authors use both terms in the same context. A
similar finding recognized this practice and also chose to use the words
somewhat interchangeably.^ A distinction between decision making and problem
^Manley Jones, Executive Decision Making (Homewood, Illinois: Richard
D. Irwin, Inc., 1957), p. 5.
TTiilo Nieminen, "A Survey of Problem Solving Methods," (unpublished
Master's thesis, School of Government, The George Washington university, 1959),
p. 2.

solving has been provided:
The only kind of decision that really centers in problem-
solving is the unimportant, the routine, the tactical decision.
If both the conditions of the situation and the requirements that
the answer has to satisfy are known and simple, problem solving
is indeed the only thing -necessary. ^
Tiiis is only one view and it has not been recognized and accepted by all of
the contemporary theorists. However, since most decisions must be made
under varying conditions of uncertainty which do not permit an exact solution,
the term "decision making" will be used in this paper. It should be observed
that many of the references cited do not always do so.
The acceptance of the term decision making seems reasonable when the
basic types of decisions are considered. These are: decisions under
certainty, decisions under risk, and decisions under uncertainty. In
decisions under certainty the outcome is 99-44/100 per cent assured.
Decisions under risk permit consideration of various possible futures whose
probabilities can be estimated. Less information is available than in
decisions under certainty. Where the decision maker considers various
alternatives whose probabilities cannot be estimated because of even less
information than in decision under risk, the decisions are under uncertainty.
Decisions may also be classified in regard to the bases used by
decision makers. Such a classification includes those who make decisions by:
(1) intuition and hunches; (2) impetuously jumping to a conclusion; (3)
brooding and hesitating; (4) being content to identify two or three
alternatives; (5) being dissatisfied until every conceivable possibility has
^Peter F. Drucker, The Practice o f Ilanagcment (New York: Harper and
Brothers, Publishers, 1954), pp. 351-352."

4been explored; (6) being insensitive to change and always using what has
worked before; (7) being so sensitive to every possibility that each
situation is treated as an entirely new and unknown thing.
"
The foregoing list suggests that decision makers possess differing
qualities, but does not indicate the qualities or skills usually needed to
make sound decisions. Three of the skills on which effective administration
has been said to depend are technical, human and conceptual. The conceptual
skill, which requires an understanding of the totality of an organization
and the interrelationships of its components for specific functions, becomes
increasingly more important with the need for policy decisions and broad-
scale action. ^ A more comprehensive analysis sets forth the intellectual
qualities of a manager. These have been summarized under the general
headings of factual attitude, quantitative attitude, logical qualities and
qualities of action.
Factual Attitude . Have patience and desire to get the facts, be
reluctant to Jump to conclusions, but do not hesitate to use such reasoning
and judgment* as you must if lack of facts or lack of time prevents thorough
research of a problem.
Quantitative Attitude . Strive patiently and creatively to prove the
results of your decision by searching for variables that can be measured,
but do not let yourself be enchanted by mathematical systems to the point
where you postpone or shun judgment when action is necessary.
"William A. Reitsel, Background to Decision Making (Newport, R. I.:
U. S. Ilaval iter College, 1953), pp. 24-25.
7
Robert L. Katz, "Skills of an Effective Administrator,'' Harvard
Business Review XXXIII, 1 (1955), p. 34 and p. 39.

5Logical Qualities
(1) Modified Theoretical Attitude . Reasoning and quiet thought and
the use of theory from others can be valuable in professional practice,
provided I maintain a healthy distrust and willingness to abandon theoretical
concepts if they do not fit uy specific problem.
(2) Modified Attitude toward Truth . Do the best you can in the time
available and use the terms that have proved to be most useful in your
thinking.
(3) Modified Attitude toward Consistency . It will sometimes be
necessary to substitute "reasonableness" in a broad sense for syllogistic
precision in thinking.
Qualities of Action
Attitudes that Influence the Action-centered Mind
(1) A desire to change things to obtain results.
(2) A predisposition for timely action instead of waiting for a
deluge of facts.
(3) Judgmental qualities which are broken down as conceptual judgment,
quantity judgment and whole problem judgment. Conceptual judgments involve
areas ivfaere ideas cannot be reduced to fundamental concepts. Quantity
judgments are those in which the effects of taking certain known numerical
actions cannot be used to predict quantitative results for specific factors.
Whole problem judgments involve thousands of chain effects and must be
a
decided on the basis of incomplete knowledge of all of the relationships.




6These intellectual qualities, particularly the quantitative attitude, bring
to mind an ability which is mentioned more and more in decision making:
creativity. It has been said that:
People who are creatively alert are much more interesting than
those who are not. They seem to belong to a different species, or
perhaps to a higher level of evolution. They see not only what is
but what might be; and the power to see what might be is one of
the chief traits that distinguish human beings from one another.
^
A recognition that particular qualities and skills are required for
decision making leads indirectly to the importance of decision making.
Economics teaches that resources are limited and must be efficiently
allocated if we are to achieve our goals. This requires that sound decisions
be made in a timely manner if we are to preserve our way of life, particularly
in the event of a major armed struggle. In business and industry there has
been an increasing need for better decisions as the "profit squeeze" and
inflation have exerted their pressures. Firms which could shot; profits in
sellers' markets have realized that their future depended on improved
decision making in buyers' markets. In the federal government the complexities
of this age require that decisions be more carefully considered yet produced
in record time. In this regard, the committee system of decision making has
been attacked from many quarters because it places a premium on the
cultivation of a nice mixture of noncontroversialness and colorless
semicompetence while denying the men with the final responsibility the clear,
sharp choices which they need to rnake.^-^ The trends indicate that future
^Harry A. Overs treet, The Mature Mind (New York: W. W. Norton and Co.,
Inc., 1949), p. 104.
10Stewart Alsop, "The Trouble with the State Department," The Saturday
Even..ap, Post (March 3, 1962), p. 14.

7management will become analytical and scientific, administration per se will
attain professional status, and business decisions will be set in a framework
of political and social mores as well as the market place. In such an
environment independent problem-solving ability is the critical element in
the skills of a professional man. **
None of the foregoing has stated how to improve decision making.
Rather it has followed the theme of most popular literature which provides
perspective to the decision-making process by discussing some types of
decisions, qualities and skills of decision makers, and the importance of
decision making.
It is a basic premise of this paper that decision making can be
improved. Such improvement requires: (1) an understanding of the contributions
of various disciplines, theories, methods and techniques; (2) an appreciation
of the applicability of these contributions, particularly the gaps in
knowledge and limitations of methods and techniques. The significant
contributions of philosophy, psychology, economics, and statistics will be
reviewed in Chapter II.
H-G. Leland Bach, ''Accounting Education for the 1980' s," The Journal




CONTRIBUTIONS OF SELECTED DISCIPLINES
An anasing amount of progress toward understanding the decision-making
process in the technical sciences, statistics, mathematics and electronics,
has been made in the past 15 years. In psychology and sociology, work has
been done on perception, memory, attitudes, learning, personality, motivation,
communication flow, opinion leadership, and social strata and mobility.
The field of statistics, which previously contributed probability sampling,
has in more recent years perfected a new development called statistical
decision theory. This approach combines both judgment and statistical
evidence in making decisions.
Usually each discipline adopts a different point of view. The
economist is concerned with economic choice and maximization through choosing
the best available alternatives. Some psychologists have been concerned
with considerations of the threshold levels that limit the sensitivity of
response to various stimuli. Other psychologists have instigated decisions
to select alternatives from a set of choices by subjects faced with varying
forms of uncertainty. In the studies of small-group behavior there has been
Joseph W. Newman, "Put Research into Marketing Decisions," Harvard
Business Review (March-April, 1962), p. 105.

9some overlapping by the psychologist and the sociologist. Statisticians
have come closer to the behaviorial sciences in their more recent decision-
making theories. More and more it has become apparent that decision making
includes many diverse fields and that an interdisciplinary approach has
resulted in much of the progress.
It is not possible to review in detail all of the contributions to
decision making by every known discipline. A review of some of the major
contributions of philosophy, psychology, economics and statistics will provide
a frame of reference for the decision-making process.
Philosophy
Philosophy has provided some of the primary insights to problem
solving. Essentially these are in the areas of logic and scientific method.
John Dewey is referenced in much of the literature for the stages in problem
solving which he first described:
What is the problem?
What are the alternatives?
3Which alternative is best?
In a later work, Dewey discussed the pattern of inquiry in such
manner as to aid problem formulation and identification. Inquiry is defined
as the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation
^Martin Shubik, "Studies and Theories in Decision Making,"
Admiiistrative Science Quarterly (December, 1958), p. 289.
3John Dewey, How We Think (New York: D. C. Heath and Company, 1910),
chap. 8.
John Dewey, Lo^ic - The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, Inc., 193S) , chap. 6.
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into one in which the elements of the original situation are converted into
a unified whole. Five steps are then listed through which an original
situation, where the constituent parts lack unity, may be converted:
1. The antecedent conditions of inquiry: the indeterminate situation.
2. Institution of a problem.
3. The determination of a problem-solution.
4. Reasoning.
5. The operational character of facts-meanings.
Tiie process begins with the unique indeterminate situation which is
differentiated from other indeterminate situations not only by uncertainty
at large but the peculiar quality of the given materials. tfoile the
indeterminate situation comes into existence through existential causes, the
peculiar quality of the indeterminate situation exercises control over the
special procedures employed in the inquiry. Problem institution stems from
subjecting the indeterminate situation to inquiry. In the process, a partial
transformation is effected. Discovering the problems which such a
problematic situation presents for inquiry is to be well along into inquiry.
At this point it is important to note that:
The way in which the problem is conceived decides what
specific suggestions are entertained and which are dismissed; what
data are selected and which rejected; it is the criterion for
relevancy and irrelevancy of hypotheses and conceptual structures.
^
In the third step, determination of a problem solution, it is necessary to
seek out facts of the problem and ideas of possible relevant solutions. This
-
'Ibid
. , p. 1GS.
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effort is toward formulation of the problem in such terms that inquiries will
move toward the solution. In so doing it must be recognised that no
completely indeterminate situation can be transformed into a problem
possessing definite constituents. The fourth step of reasoning requires that
the meaning of ideas be developed in their relation to one another. Exact
thinking in the sense of ratiocination is required. A meaning more clearly-
relevant to the problem in hand than the original suggested idea should
finally be reached. The remaining step of the operational character of facts-
meanings necessitates that the existential facts pertinent to locating and
describing the problem be compared with the meanings of the non-existential
ideas. To the extent that there is agreement, the interaction of facts and
ideas should furnish a sequence of suggestions and point to a possible
solution.
Logic, as might be expected, offers a sound basis for the objective
rationality which is sought in decision making. Traditionally it has been
concerned with the study of what constitutes proof or conclusive evidence.
In cases where the conclusion is implied by certain premises, the reasoning
from the latter to the form is called deductive. A movement from the given
partial and possibly confused data to a suggested comprehensive entire
situation is inductive. Generally, the inductive movement is toward the
discovery of a binding principle; the deductive toward its testing. This
double movement is characteristic of reflection where the problem fixes the
end of thought and the end controls the process of thinking. In this same
vein John Dewey has written that:

12
Active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief
or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support
it, and the further conclusions to which it tends, constitute
reflective thought."
It should be further noted chat facts cannot be discovered without reflection,
and the facts for which every inquiry searches are propositions for whose
truth there is considerable evidence.
Another concept of value to decision making is systematic inference.
It may be defined as the recognition of definite relations of interdependence
between previously unorganised and disconnected considerations. We infer one
proposition from another validly only if there is an objective relation of
implication between the first proposition and the second. It is essential
to distinguish inference, which is a temporal process, from implication,
which is an objective relation between propositions.'
Good judgment is necessary to distinguish between observations and
inferences. Observations result from utilization of the senses to see, hear,
feel, smell or taste. Inferences, on the other hand, are decisions which
arc correctly or incorrectly drawn from our observations. Most inferences
require further testing to insure that erroneous conclusions are not formed.
The "Uncritical Inference Test 1 has been designed by Dr. Mhu V. Haney of
Northwestern University to train executives and military men to distinguish
between observations and inferences." A sample test is reproduced in
Dewey, How We Think , p. 6.
'Premises and conclusions are propositions. For purposes of logic
a proposition may be defined as anything which can be said to be true or
false.




In relation to scientific method, scientific thinking analyses the
present case, varies conditions one by one and notes what happens when a
given condition is eliminated. It relies on observed differences and varying
conditions to create differences. Scientific reasoning is a combined process
of analysis and synthesis. Through analysis one fact may be found to be the
key to a phenomenon. In synthesis, the opposite of analysis, separate
elements of thought are combined x;ith a group from which they were previously
isolated to form a whole.
Some of the pitfalls which logic and scientific method warn against
are in the nature of stable beliefs. Habit or inertia makes it easier for
us to continue to believe a px-oposition simply because we have, always
believed it. A method other than tenacity is required for achieving stable
views. Appeal is also made to authority for substantiation of views.
This is usually done by having a question resolved by experts whose authority
is ackno\;Iedged. It obviously fails where the experts don't agree. An even
weaker appeal to authority results from investing some source with finality
and using external force to sanction such decisions. Methods of intuition
which appeal to -'self-evident' propositions are often found to be capricious
and willful. The belief that the "earth is flat" was founded on such an
indubitable conviction of truth. Tradition, instruction and imitation
represent thoughts that grow up unconsciously and without reference to the
attainment of correct belief. Empirical thinking in the sense of learning
from repeated observations that certain things always happen in a particular
fashion or pattern is also to be guarded against. It can lead to false
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beliefs, inability to cope with the ill-structurccl novel, dogmatism,
unjustifiable conservatism and laziness.
A methodology for decision making which is slightly expanded from the
one originally provided by John Dewey consists of:
1. Problem.
2. Formulation of a relevant hypothesis (suggested explanation or
solution)
.
3. Possible alternative hypotheses (logic aids in formulating
propositions explicitly and accurately, so that possible alternatives become
clear)
.
4. Consequences (compare with observable phenomenon and test which
hypothesis is to be eliminated) .9
The steps in this methodology are self-explanatory with the exception of the
problem stage. It is significant to note in this respect that philosophers
have emphasized that no inquiry can get under way until and unless some
difficulty is felt in a practical or theoretical situation. It is the
problem or difficulty which guides the search for order among the facts, in
terms of which the difficulty is removed. The ability to perceive a problem,
particularly a problem whose solution will facilitate the solution of other
problems, is not a common talent. Few rules can be given which enable men
to investigate and ask questions about situations. Sensitivity to
difficulties may be the trait which distinguishes scientific genius.
^Horrifl R. Cohen and Earnest Nagel, An Introduction to Lo^ic and
Scientific Method (New York: Iiarcourt, Brace and Co., 1934), p. 195.
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Finally, to those v?ho feel that common sense is adequate for decision
making, the following is appropriate:
Common sense is content with a miscellaneous collection of
information. As a consequence, the propositions it asserts are
frequently vague, the range of their application is unknown, and
their mutual compatibility is generally very questionable. 1^
Psychology
Psychologists have been concerned with how best to encourage and
improve problem-solving abilities. Generally the field is in an unsatisfactory
state as psychologists have raised more questions than they have answered.
Certain contributions, however tentative, have been made in problem
identification, terminology, approaches to problem solving, and in factor
analysis.
The problem situation is said to exist when there is a perplexity
about how to overcome a difficulty. It involves a breakdown in the previous
pattern of relationship between an organism and the environment in x/hich it
operates. It is only when a novel situation arises, one for which there is
no effective adjustment response available, that you can significantly talk
about a problem situation. The situation itself does not make adjustment
difficult, however, unless there is a strong and compelling compulsion on the
individual to find a satisfactory solution. A related element is that
uncertainty is involved and closely related to uncertainty is the matter of
expectation. Some writers speak of uncertainty situations rather than problem
situations. An uncertainty situation can only be resolved at some future point
J-Qlbid . . p. 392.
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in time as a consequence of action taken in the present. To decide, plan
and execute action in a rational manner, the desired future situation oust
have first been established as a goal, objective or purpose.
Problem situations exist in a spectrum that runs from the individual
confronted by uncertainty, through any organized group of human bei
confronted by obstacles to the achievement of their purposes. The ways in
which the elements of novelty, uncertainty and compulsion are related and
affect the decision-making response differ for any given part of the spectrum.
Regardless of where on the spectrum a problem situation is located, it is
dealt with either by individuals in isolation or by individuals associated in
organized groups. The individual human response to a problem situation is,
therefore, the foundation of the decision-making process.
In reacting to a situation it must be realised that man possesses a
very limited span of attention and a severely restricted memory. The problem
is to narrow the range of observations to those essential for acting in the
immediate situation. The basic technique is to reduce diversity to simple
formulas by being selective. It is called perception and in this view is
"a decision process played on a probability basis—a gambling in
11
selectivity." " The gamble is guided by two simultaneous motivations with
respect to outcome: (1) to maximise gratification and be in a position to
achieve an expectation; (2) to minimize surprise and be in a position to cope
with contingencies.
^Reitzel, op. cit . , p. 5.
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Modification of the selectivity pattern nay be achieved through
learning. Training emphasises repetition and the build-up of habitual reflex
responses. As such it introduces additional risks of inadequate responses
in uncertainty situations. Indoctrination has understanding as its basis
and the utilization of conscious flexible response. Both training and
indoctrination operate at varying degrees in human learning but produce
different results in the way that meanings or knowledge is subsequently used.
In the section on philosophy, brief mention was made of problem
sensitivity. Psychologists have found that this trait varies widely from
12
p vrson to person. It appears to be related to the extent to which an
individual shows "openness to experience" or is "conscious of his
surroundings." The capacity to define a problem accurately in relation to
objectives has been termed "goal-oriented problem solving." The opposite
the "technique-oriented problem solver" who finds it difficult to define a
problem realistically but easy to make a problem fit a prescribed formula.
Such persons are usually quick to offer a standard, tried and true solution
but very slow to test this solution for actual relevance.
Two approaches employed by psychologists are what may be termed
psychology of learning and personality and social psychology. The first
relates problem solving to learning and thinking, a cognitive process, in
which a high-order but not necessarily original product emerges. The second
is concerned with personality manifestations and looks for social and
motivational determinants in addition to the purely cognitive ones.
3-2a trait is any distinguishable, relatively endurable way in which
one individual differs from another.

IS
The psychology of learning approach applies to problems which involve
a correct answer or solution. To accomplish this the problem must be sensible
and have meaning for the learner. In 1953 and 1954, Hilgard found that
results achieved by understanding are retained longer than those learned by
rote.*-* The lesson to be learned from these studies is that the extra time
and effort needed to learn by understanding is well spent when it comes to
dealing with new problems similar to but at the same time different from the
ones used in training. There is also a belief that miscellaneous uncoded
facts, stored in memory as isolated fragments, may overtax our systems and
certainly not be fully useful in solving problems. -^
One of the unfavorable circumstances of the psychology of learning
approach is that there is often too much persistence in following a single
direction that is no longer appropriate for the solution of a problem. VJhen
we get : 'set" in one way of regarding things, we often fail to consider other
possibilities. In some cases we lose flexibility because we are satisfied
with a particular course of action and do not seek additional alternatives.
The concept of "functional fixation" has been invented to explain why we
employ certain tools only in established and traditional ways. In certain
experiments it was found that the more time elapsed between normal and novel
use of an object the less the functional fixedness. This may partially
explain why a baffling problem is sometimes solved upon our return to it
after a period of absence.
"Ernest R. Hilgard, "Creativity and Problem Solving" in Creativity
and its Cultivation , Edited by Harold II. Anderson (New York: Harper and
Brothers Publishers, 1959), p. 167.
14
G. A. Miller, "The Magic Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some
Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information," Psychological Review
(Vol. 63, 1956), pp. 81-97.
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The personality and social psychology approach views the problem
solver as one and indivisible. He does many things at the same time. In
various situations and time frames the problem solver demonstrates trial and
error, insight* the influence of social conformity, and even traits such as
masculinity. In this regard there appears to be a sex difference favoring
men where the problems to be solved are of the kind requiring some
restructuring of the problem before it can be solved. Another experiment
found that under conditions where a subject has to assert his convictions
when he is a minority of one against a majority of four, the nonconformist in
this situation is a better problem solver.^
Factor analysis has been used to discover primary traits related to
creativity and problem solving. Guilford lias found these traits to be:
1. Ability to see problems or a generalised sensitivity to problems.
(Without this step productive thinking would not be initiated.)
2. Fluency of thinking--relates to the quantitative aspect of
producing ideas.
3. Flexibility of thinking—not persisting in wrong but inviti
directions.
4. Originality—tested by unusualness of responses.
5. Redefinition—giving up old interpretations of familiar objects
to use them or their parts in some neu r.;ay. Has also been called "functional
fixation."




6. Elaboration--quantitative addition of detail.
Factor analysis has not detected a unitary ability to solve problems.
A number of unitary abilities are involved, but their combination and
respective weights depend upon the kind of problem. Fluency, flexibility and
originality fall in the general category of divergent thinking. This is
characterized by searching activities with freedom to go in different
directions. Redefinition is considered in the category of convergent thinking.
This involves proceeding toward one right answer that is more or less clearly
demanded by the given information. Sensitivity to problems is placed in the
category of evaluation. This as the name implies relates to the evaluation
of information, of responses derived from the information, and of conclusions.
In so doing, decisions as to whether problem solutions are correct, adequate,
suitable, etc., are made.
The question of whether a group or an individual does better thinking
in problem solving has not been answered. To date the results are about a
draw, so far as laboratory problems are concerned. Most group results do not
indicate any efficiency over a number of individuals working separately and
pooling their findings.
Economics
Economics has often been assailed as too theoretical and too
indefinite by those who seek exact and precise answers. Much of this feeling
results from the fact that the economist never developed rules useful to the
16
J. P. Guilford, "Traits of Creativity' in Creativity and its
Cultivation , Edited by Harold H. Anderson (Hew York: Harper and Brothers
Publishers, 1959), p. 145.
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businessman. In many instances economists have developed U-shaped cost
curves and postulates to show the point at which marginal costs equal marginal
revenue. Such advice has not been useful because of the difficulty of
determining marginal costs.
Today the Department of Defense and the federal government are more
concerned about economics than ever before. The limitations on human, natural,
capital and institutional resources present some hard choices, not only
between individual and collective wants, but more particularly in deciding
how much of our resources shall be devoted to various ends such as defense,
agriculture, education, welfare, etc. Such decisions necessitate the
establishment of goals and a knowledge of the means to be used to achieve
these goals. Economists cannot provide good answers until they know what is
17
wanted, the goals to be sought and their order of preference. '
Decision-making models of economic man, particularly as he is
described in the theory of consumer choice, present him as a rational, all-
knowing person who chooses among well defined alternatives in such manner as
to maximize his utility if he is a consumer, or his profit if he is a
J obusinessman. ° Unfortunately this model is not realistic, as evidenced by
the number of business failures every year due to the ignorance of costs or
methods of business.
^Dr. J. W. Skinner, Lecture, Havy Graduate Financial Management




Economics does, however, offer a way of deciding the relative merits
of various courses of action. It insists that we define problems in terms
of facts and identify our objectives in some order of priority. It tells us
to examine alternative ways to achieve objectives, and it gives us tools to
measure the likely consequences of various possible actions. One of the best
known tools in decision making is the indifference curve for expressing the
relationship between goals or objectives. Over-all, economics provides
19
a method for orderly thinking about our resources.
Statistics
Statistics, as a body of knowledge, has contributed to decision
making by facilitating the preparation of predictions and estimates in many
situations. "The field of statistics involves methods and theory as they are
applied to numerical data with the objective of making rational decisions in
the face of uncertainty." This definition is appropriate not only as it
relates to decision making but to indicate that it is the subject of
statistics rather than numerical data which will be discussed. Statistics
relies on mathematics, the queen of the sciences, to state concepts, ideas
and relationships. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the subject
of statistical decision making is discussed in the literature by many
engineers, particularly industrial and management engineers.
J "^Luther H. Hodges, "IJe're Flunking our Economic ABC's," The Saturday




^Ernest Kurnow, Gerald J. Glasser, and Frederick R. Ottman,




The role of statistics in the decision-making process is beet examined
by setting forth the basic characteristics of the decision-making process,
as seen by the statisticians. -* These may be summarised as follows:
1. A decision problem is a problem in deciding on a course of action.
Unless action can be taken, a problem situation does not call for decision.
This is the so-called "principle of action."
2. Alternative courses of action must be available.
3. Alternatives are classified as desirable or undesirable in terms
of their conseqtiences which depend upon certain conditions. To determine
what these conditions are we must know the "true state of the world." In most
problems there are many possible states of the world, and it is not always
possible to determine exactly which is the true one.
4. Data for solution of a problem are gathered after a statistical
decision rule has been formulated. In effect, the data are gathered for a
purpose since a course of action which will be taken has been determined
prior to the collection of data. This is known as the "principle of planning."
In a problem where statistics can be employed to reduce uncertainty,
the problem must be translated into statistical terms. This involves
defining the statistical population and specifying the decision parameter.
The statistical population is the total relevant observations that can be made
in a problem. When only a part of a population is observed, that part is
called a sample. The decision-parameter is a summary of the observed data in





tendency and measures of variability in lieu of decision-parameter. In either
case, the terms refer to the proportion, aggregate* arithmetic mean, aver,
deviation, standard deviation, etc., where they are used for decision making
and the complete population is available and used.
Having stated the problem statistically and chosen a decision
parameter, it is necessary to decide whether data should be collected. In
some instances the costs of making observations will exceed the value to be
derived from the observations. If data are to be collected, it usually is
necessary to employ some type of sampling method. Since sampling introduces
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risks, it is necessary to utilize probability sampling, in which the risks
can be objectively evaluated. One of the applications of probability theory,
developed by mathematicians, is statistics. It permits predictions of the
variations which can be expected in a statistic which summarizes some
information about a sample. Since probability should be expressed
quantitatively, a numerical measure of probability is employed. Generally It
is interpreted as the proportion of times an outcome would occur in an
infinite series of repeated trials. 23 The most common example is that of
flipping a coin where the probability of a head is 50% in the long run.
Estimation methods may be considered schemes for making statements
about the future. The basis for estimating probabilities is past experience
and the assumption that all outcomes are equiprobable. Prediction means that
22ibid.
, p. 119. Probability sampling is a selection procedure in





some explicit method of collecting data on past events is employed, and
inferences about the future are then made from the data. Judgment on the
other hand is characterised by resorting to guesses, expert opinion, etc.
A more sophisticated term that has recently appeared is "subjective
probability." It has been defined as the decision maker's judgments, guesses,
or feelings about the likelihood of a future event. "In most decisions a
complex mixture of prediction and judgment is actually used. "24
All problems of measurement, including the measurement of valuer,
involve the construction and use of scales. 25 These fall into three basic
types: ordinal, internal and ratio.
The ordinal scale is simply a ranking. Through the method of paired
comparisons the task is made easier and a check on the internal consistency
of value judgments is obtained. In it the decision maker considers outcomes
two at a time and indicates the preferred outcome for each pair. This is
carried on until all possible pairs of outcomes have been subjected to
comparative value judgment. Where there are n outcomes, n(n-l)(l/2) pairs
must be judged. For an ordinal scale to be constructed all value judgments
must be changeable and temporary. Since ordinal scales are based on
judgment, their validity is most questionable.
An internal scale has an arbitrary aero point and a constant unit of
measurement. A ratio scale has an absolute zero point and a constant unit of
measurement. When we evaluate an outcome in dollars of profit, we are using
a ratio scale.
-^William T. Morris, Engineering Economy (Homewood, Illinois: Richard





A general problem solving program has been developed by the Carnegie-
RAND research group. ^° In the laboratory a problem, such as proving a theorem
in Euclidian geometry, is given a subject and he is asked to think aloud while
he solves it. The researchers realise that not all of the subject's thought
processes will rise to the level of consciousness or be verbalised. They have
tape recorded what was said, however, and later analysed the recording. In so
doing it was observed that the subject compared the theorem with a theorem he
knew—that he looked for similarities and differences. These suggest
subproblems whose solutions may contribute to the solution of the problem. In
turn these generate subproblems until the subject comes to a problem he can
solve directly. This results in a movement back up the scale of subproblems
and the assembling of results v:b.ic.h may aid in the solution of the whole
problem. As the pieces fit together the problem solver persists in a
particular direction. When they do not, the subject must explore other
possibilities.
The general problem solver program was initially inferred from the
studies of human thinking in the laboratory and subsequently coded for computer
simulation. It is a program for reasoning in terms of ends and means, goals
and subgoals, about problematic situations. It is believed to reproduce most
of the thought processes of humans observed in the laboratory and to furnish
some explanation for the organisation of those processes. As reportedly
conceived, the general problem solver will attack three types of goals:
26simon, The Hew Science of Management Decision , pp. 21-30. The
research on complex information processes sponsored by the Graduate School of
Industrial Administration at Carnegie Institute of Technology and the RAND
Corporation, in which Herbert A. Simon and his colleagues—Allen Newell and
J. C. Shaw—have been engaged, is described.
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1. Transform goals: Change a into b.
2. Reduce difference goals: Eliminate or reduce the
difference between a and b.
3. Apply operator goals: Apply the program (or operator
or method) £ to the situation j.. 27
Various methods of achieving these goals are associated with the three types.
The method for changing a into b is to find a difference, d, between them and
formulate the reduce difference goal £ eliminating this difference. A method
for reducing a difference between a and b is to find a relevant operator for
removing the differences in question, and to apply that operator. A method
for applying an operator is to compare the actual situation with a situation
that would make it possible to apply the operator, and to formulate the goal
of changing the actual situation into the required situation.
Summary
This brief review of some of the contributions of philosophy,
psychology, economics and statistics provides a background for understanding
the decision-making process. In philosophy the rational approach to decision
making has been depicted in the objective processes employed in inquiry, the
reasoning processes of reflective thinking and systematic inference, and
scientific method. Two decision-making methodologies were described.
A different viex? of the problem situation was presented in the section
on psychology. Attention was focused on individual human responses and some
Of the limitations of man. In learning it was shown that man is a better




factor analysis certain traits have been isolated which relate to problem
solving and creativity. These are: (1) the ability to see problems or a
generalized sensitivity; (2) fluency of thinking; (3) flexibility of thinki:
(4) originality; (5) redefinition; and (G) elaboration.
Economics, while not offering simple rules for the businessman, does
contribute to the difficult decision-making choices of allocating scarce
resources. The decision-making approach of economics may be favorably compared
with the methodology of philosophy. In economics a new factor of an order of
priority for objectives was introduced.
Statistics facilitates the summarisation of relevant data for the
purpose of making predictions and estimates under conditions of uncertainty.
More exact description is required in quantification which utilises
definiteness in procedures and thinking. Summarization of data aids in
providing meaning and convenience in handling. Thus certain general
conclusions may be drawn and predictions made. The basic characteristics of
the decision-making process as seen by the statisticians are:
(a) The "priiiciple of action." It must be possible to take action.
(b) Availability of alternative courses of action.
(c) Classification of alternatives under varying conditions described
as "states of the world."
(d) The ''principle of planning." Formulating an a priori decision
rule before gathering data.




The joint contribution of the Carneyie-SAHD research group is
indicative of the efforts being made in heuristic problem solving. It may
be possible from such work to discover how successful persons solve problems
and to teach such procedures to others. '..liile the procedures will vary with
the situation, better decision making can result from the knowledge of how
an individual should proceed. This entails the development of guides and
patterns for making observations, seeking similarities and differences,
transforming goals, and applying operator goals to situations.

CHAPTER III
SOME DECISION THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES
Decision theory is concerned with problems of choice. Older forms
of the theory were primarily philosophical and concerned with how men and
organisations should choose to achieve their objectives. These were the
normative theories which offered recommendations and guides to decision
making. Later forms of the theory were the descriptive theories which were
concerned with how people or firms actually do make decisions, or with
attempts to predict hot/ a decision maker will actually choose. This later
category of descriptive theories were psychological in nature. The
contemporary form of theory attempts to combine both questions and tends to
be concerned with both the should and the how . Combining the t\J0 questions
alters the nature of the problem of choice and is concerned with the question
of optimal choice.
Practice has assumed that decision-making was something
of an art; and as such rested upon the trained experience and
judgment of individuals. Decision theory implies that there
is a science of decision-making; that just as technological change
rests upon a basis of mathematics and the physical sciences, so
decision theory rests upon a basis of mathematics and the





In terras of objective validated evidence, very little is known about how
decisions are actually made, either by individuals or groups. The theories
presented are, therefore, useful only to the extent that they provide insight
and may furnish guideposts to our thinking.
Decision Theories
Probably the best known work representative of one of the older
decision-making theories was written by Chester Barnard. 2 He states that:
When decision is involved there are consciously present
two terms--the end to be accomplished and the means to be used.
The end itself may be the result of logical processes in which
the end is in turn a means to some broader or remote end; or the
immediate end, and generally the ultimate end, may not be a result
of logical processes, but "given"--that is, unconsciously
impressed—by conditions, including social conditions past or
present, including orders or organizations. But whenever the end
has been determined, by whatever process, the decision as to means
is itself a logical process of discrimination, analysis, choice--
however defective either the factual basis for choice or the
reasoning related to these facts.
This statement emphasises choice of means and logical process. Because of
this it bridges the movement from normative to descriptive theory. While it
can be argued that rationality should be sought, a principal difficulty in
achieving rationality is the lack of complete information available to the
decision maker.
The requirements of rationality have recently been set forth as
explicitness of the decision process, logical consistency and logical truth.
^Chester Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, Mass.:




Explicitness refers to consciously carrying out the decision process in such
a manner that all the elements and steps in the process can be listed and
described. This includes stating the alternatives which were considered in
a decision, how the consequences of choosing various alternatives were
predicted, how these consequences were evaluated, what the decision was, and
whether the decision was correct or in error. To the extent that this is
achieved, decisions can be checked and reviewed by others, ways of improving
bad decisions may be sought, and knowledge of decision making enlarged.
Explicitness also makes it clear where in the decision process analysis was
concluded and judgment begun.
Logical consistency refers to avoiding contradictions in the analysis
of a decision, v/here the goal is profit, decisions which will result in a
loss are avoided. Alternatively, we try to avoid arithmetical mistakes and
mistakes in mathematics generally. Consistency is not adequate alone, however,
as it could lead to consistently wrong decisions.
Logical truth means that decisions must be in agreement with
observations and inferences from these observations. It is another way of
saying "get the facts. " Because of the limitations of time, cost, analytical
skills, and knowledge of decision -making, nearly every significant decision
involves a deficiency of certain information.
In his General Theory of Administration, Litchfield offers some minor
propositions x-egarding how decisions are made. They are:
^Edward II. Litchfield, ;,Notes on a General Theory of Administration, 1 '
Administrative Science Quarterly , I (1956), pp. 3-29.
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Minor Proposition: Decision making may be rational,
deliberative, discretionary, purposive, or it may be irrational,
habitual, obligatory, random or any combination thereof. In its
rational, deliberative, discretionary and purposive form, it is
performed by means of the following sub-activities:
a. Definition of the issue.
b. Analysis of the existing situation.
c. Calculation and deliberation of alternatives.
d. Deliberation.
e. Choice.
In explaining the sequence of actions it is acknowledged that few decisions
follou or fully utilize this pattern. The problem may not require definition;
preconccl/cd opinions and biases may cause only a superficial search for
alternatives; and deliberation may be limited by the pressures of time, cost
or availability of knowledge and skills. Further, the decision maker must
allow, but probably doesn't, for his own irrationality as xrell as the
irrationality of others.
aor Proposition: Decisions become guides to action after
they have been interpreted in the form of specific programs.
This involves program planning and its wide range of specific methods and
techniques such as: organisation charts, personnel levels, various budgets,
and other means to translate the decision into the allocation of money,
manpower, and material,
Minor Proposition: The effectiveness of a programmed
decision will vary with the extent to which it is communicated
to those of whom action is required.
This statement is self-explanatory; given that it is difficult to measure
effectiveness in many instances, one of the problems in communicating a
decision is to insure that there are adequate channels available of minimum
practicable length to preclude distortion and misunderstanding.
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Minor Proposition: Action required by a programmed and
communicated decision is more nearly assured if standards of
performance are established and enforced.
Varying techniques have been devised to assure performance x;hich are
characterised by the term "control. :l Usually control is accomplished through
organisation charts, function statements, budgets, and operating standards.
A danger to guard against is that control does not become an end in itself.
Minor Proposition: Decisions are based on facts,
assumptions, and values vhich are subject to change. To
retain their validity, decisions must therefore be reviewed
and revised as rapidly as change occurs.
An interesting parallel may be observed between this statement and the
statisticians 1 concept of "states of the world. 1 ' It will be recalled that
the consequences of a decision must be appraised in light of existing
circumstances and conditions, or predicted for the future, Litchfield in
discussing this proposition offers the cybernetic thought that the decision
itself may bring about sufficient change to warrant reconsideration. To
intelligently review and revise decisions there is a critical dependency upon
information generated by the original decision. This has been termed
"feedback." It should further be noted that many outmoded policies are
based on conditions or facts which no longer obtain. A method of quantifying
the costs of maintaining traditionally accepted policies has been advanced to
demonstrate that many policies are inappropriate in the present socio-economic
cltaate. 6
%orhert Weiner, The Human Use of Human Beings; Cybernetics and
Society (Hew York: Doubleday and Co., 1954), p. 20.
"Melvin Ashen, "Price Tags for Business Policies," Harvard Business
Review
,
(January/February, 1960), pp. 71-78.
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A third theory of decision making gives primary attention to the
social context in which decisions are made.' The word "behavior 1 ' in each of
the steps of the decision-making process indicates the psychological flavor
of the process.
1. Awareness of behavior alternatives.
2. Definition of behavior alternatives.
3. Evaluation of behavior alternatives."
These steps are somewhat similar to those previously noted in Chapter I, under
Contributions of Selected Disciplines and also set forth under the first minor
premise of Litchfield. Although a first step titled "problem" or "issue"
is not supplied, Tannenbaum states in his discussion that the decision-making
process is initiated by stimuli, internal or external to the individual which
channel his attention in definite directions. Quite often these stimuli are
accidental or arbitrary in nature and to this extent the individual's
behavior is not rational. A further distinction is that there are definite
limitations to rational behavior.
These limits stem from the individual's lack of knowledge
with respect to the existence of behavior alternatives and the
consequences that will follow from them both from the subjective
processes which are necessarily involved in defining alternatives
when uncertainty is present, from time limitations, and from the
psychological difficulties involved in holding alternatives and
their consequences in focus preparatory to making a decision.
The social context of decision-making behavior takes into account the
influence of decisions on subordinates. Hierarchal decisions serve to improve
the rationality of the behavior of subordinates for organisational purposes
Robert Tannenbaum, "Managerial Decision-Making," The Journal of
Business , XXIII, 1 (1950), pp. 22-39.
GIbid . , pp. 24-25.
9 Ibid
. , p. 24, underlining supplied.
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in a number of ways.
1. Decisions which define enterprise purposes enable the members of
a group to in turn make decisions with regard to the organization's goals
rather than their own individual and personal ends. Training is used to teach
organisational purposes; incentives are used to obtain acceptance of these
purposes; supervision is used to insure that these purposes guide individual
decisions.
2. Supervisors establish the criterion of rationality to guide
subordinates in making choices. This criterion requires that optimal choices
be made in order to maximise results at a given cost or to attain given
results at the lowest cost.
3. Managers decide the types of specialisation to be utilised in an
organisation and in so doing establish limits on the activity of the
individuals filling particular positions.
4. The establishment of formal lines of authority permits the
subordinate to know definitely from whom he receives decisions made to affect
his behavior.
5. Superiors impose restraints on the general activity of subordinates
which limit the number of available alternatives from which a subordinate
must choose.
6. Superiors may be the primary source of information regarding
alternatives and the consequences of specific behavior alternatives.
7. 3y setting deadlines superiors direct the attention of
subordinates to particular problems and initiate the decision-making process.
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8. Through formal and informal communicat Ions the superior nay
specify the behavior responses of subordinates on a designated subject. Here
the subordinate need not make any decisions: just follow orders.
Since nearly every person has a boss, executives and top level
managers are subject to many of the same types of behavior restrictions as
they have placed on their subordinates. In addition, the boundaries of a
manager's decision-making authority are set by the acceptance of such
authority by those whose behavior is affected. While this concept may be
difficult to accept at first glance, it receives more credence today than
other theories of the sources of managerial authority.
Many individuals and groups, external to an organisation, subject
managers to their authority. The principal ones which impinge upon the
manager's authority and consequently have an effect on his behavior are:
1. Government agencies: local, state, and federal.
2. Parties to contracts with management.
3. Monopolistic and monopsonistic economic groups.
4. Arbitrators.
5. Cartels, trade associations, and other business associations.
6. The general social order. "
It is not practicable to reproduce here all the concepts and
explanations which the authors of the three previous decision theories have
advanced. The central theme of each of these theories has, however, been
extracted or quoted. While exact identification of these theories in terns
of period is a difficult undertaking, it will be noted that the first theory





process. The second theory may be more accurately labeled as a product of
the field of administrative science. This field is characterized by: (1) its
orientation toward sociology, social psychology and the social sciences
"proper'; and (2) a concern for the broad application of theories and methods
of the social sciences to the problems of organization. The third theory if
more representative of the combination of both how men should and actually
do choose. In it the criterion of rationality is directed toward optimal
choice.
Hypotheses
Various disciplines and interdisciplinary efforts have offered
numerous theories and hypotheses of decision-making. Having reviewed several
theories of decision-making, it is appropriate at this juncture to look at
some of the hypotheses which have been expressed about various phases of the
problem-solving and decision-making processes. Although these hypotheses are
more tentative in nature than the theories, they do stimulate additional
thought and provide some basis for the prolific forms of decision-making
methodology.
A central hypothesis of the theory of problem solving is that:
In solving problems, human thinking is governed by programs
that organize myriads of simple information processes—or symbol
manipulating responses if you like--into orderly, complex
sequences that are responsive to and adaptive to the task
environment and the clues that arc extracted from that
environment as the sequences unfold. *




While this statement is not intended to assert any resemblance between the
human brain and a computer, there is a foundation provided for a computer to
simulate human processes. Programs have been written which cncompi.
elementary information processes. It is held, therefore, that there is no
secret to problem solving because the complex structures of familiar simple
elements can be simulated.
A second somewhat related hypothesis is that:
Problem solving proceeds by erecting goals, detecting
differences between the present situation and goal, finding
in memory or by search tools or processes that are relevant
to reducing differences of these particular kinds, and
applying these tools or premises. 1^
This hypothesis is based on the work of Simon and the general problem solver
program which was described in Chapter I.
The limits of rationality derive from the inability of
the human mind to bring to bear upon a single decision all the
aspects of value, knowledge* and behavior that would be relevant.
The pattern of human choice is often more nearly a stimulus-
response pattern than a choice among alternatives. •-'
This hypothesis supplements the basic idea of acceptable choice rather than
optimal choice. It further suggests that individual limitations may be
overcome by having many people participate in the decision process. The
great use of committees, boards and councils attests to the efforts of
organisations to utilize specialized skills and diverse sources of information
and experience in decision making. Because of the limitations of those on
whom the decision rests, most information must be summarized. This process
Ibid., p. 27.
^^Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: The Macmillan
Co., 1951), p. 108.

40
brings significant data to the decision maker, but on the other hand tends
to filter out much information which may be essential to proper understand!.
Group decision brings divergent views which must be reconciled. At times
attempts at reconciliation generate disputes, power struggles, and even
breakdowns of the decision-making process.
The amount of search decreases with satisfaction, and
clearly, if little search is going on, there is a strong
tendency to persist in utilisation of existing alternatives.
There is a basic economic thought of diminishing utility and the psychological
phenomenon of resistance to change hidden in this statement. Where a decision
maker finds that all of his alternatives are not on a basis which permits
comparison in order to choose the one which is preferable, or the consequences
of each cannot be predicted, or the alternatives are otherwise unacceptable,
then difficulty will be experienced in making a choice. In the case of
uncertainty it is hypothesised that the first move will be to obtain more
information about associated consequences. If this is not successful, then
a search will be started for additional alternatives. Where the search
fails to turn up an acceptable alternative, then less desirable alternatives
may have to be accepted. In instances where the alternatives cannot be
compared, the choice may depend on the decision maker's arbitrary responses
and his sensitivity to the order in which the alternatives were examined.
The possibilities for explaining decision-making behavior
vary from the model of economic man who is highly rational,
to a model called "heroic man." 5
1% rr is
, p . 461.
1
^Ibid
. , p. 463.
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"Heroic man" 1 nay be the motivator of saints and soldiers. His ethic calls
for action without calculation of the costs or consequences. One of the
types which falls in the middle ground of limited rationality if
"sat isficing man." 16 This type is described as being concerned with whether
a program is feasible and yields enough rather than if it is maximal. This
view is understandable when considered in the limited rationality concept
where man operates under conditions of incomplete information regarding his
environment and his goals. "Timid man" and "bold man" are two additional
types in the range that are distinguished by their relation to an
organisation. ' With the tendency of modern organisations to expand formal
controls, 'timid man:i finds comfort and safety for his decisions in
regulations, instructions, and standard operating procedures. "Bold man,"
on the other hand, used the "book" as a guide and favors creative responses
in order to short-cut problems. He relies to a great extent on his
experience and professional judgment.
Summary
Decision theories may be categorised as normative, descriptive or
optimal. The older theories stemmed from philosophy and emphasized logical
thought processes. The descriptive theories of psychology, social psychology
and sociology lay stress on the limits of rationality and the shortcomings of
man's mind and knowledge of his environment and goals. Contemporary decision




theory is seeking optinal choice. Its development has been fostered by at




acre tentative and less coraplcte than theoric
have been developed :^lain how roan solves problems. They provide useful
ideas of things and relet .pa to look for in decision-making situations.
^ . .plaining dec.- . - . behavior range frosi





Decision theories and hypotheses provide a fraraev?ork f cny
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The literature on decision making is replete with forms, check lists
and schemes which often have been developed from the previously mentioned
theories and hypotheses. Nearly every author provides one which is designed
not only to aid decision making as the particular author sees it, but also to
elaborate on some aspect which he believes has been neglected. The fault
with most of these forms is that they are often applied mechanically and by
rote. Methods should be viewed as aids not ends in the decision-making
process. Their place, and their limitations, may then be better understood.
Probably the first and simplest form of a decision-making method
was furnished by Dex^ey. He offered only three stages:
What is the problem:
What are the alternatives?
Which alternative is best?*
One of the most elaborate methods contains nine stages:
1. OBSERVATION:
Assembling and analysing your facts, eliminating
opinions and impressions.
2. DEFINITION:
Defining your basic problems.
3. PREPARATION:
Gathering other pertinent data.





Breaking down the relevant material.
5. IDEATION:
Piling up alternatives by way of idea:;.
6. INCUBATION:
Letting up, to invite illumination.
7. SYNTHESIS:
Putting the pieces together.
8. EVALUATION:
Judging the resultant ideas.
9. DEVELOPMENT:
Planning the implementation of those ideas.
~
For the purposes of this paper, and because there Is much duplication
and overlapping between many of the stages of the various decision-making
methods, the stages of problem definition, data gathering, alternatives,
evaluation of alternatives, and selection of a course of action will be
discussed. This is done as a matter of convenience since it is obvious that
these stages could be compressed or expanded to suit an individual's desires.
Problem Definition
Problem definition may have many facets depending upon circumstances,
conditions and the type of problem being considered. Its importance as more
than just a starting point has been indicated as follows:
The split views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are usually
the target for most of the criticism directed at our defective
strategy making. Actually, these splits are in the main symptoms
of an ailment, not the ailment itself. They are most often
specific cases arising from more fundamental issues which lie in
the background of the day-to-day divergencies of the Joint Chiefs.
Until a Secretary of Defense requires the Chiefs to identify the
basic divergencies and to present them to him for decision, it
will never be possible to avoid splits or rise above piecemeal
2Lee H. Bristol, Jr., "The Creative Approach—Definition, Preparation
and Analysis 4 ' (Fort Belvoir, Virginia: united States Army Management School,
1961), p. 49. A talk given in the Military Problem-Solving Seminar.
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action in putting the Defense house in order. *
This statement reaches to the heart of problem definition: identification.
A problem must be identified, not by its symptoms but by its causes. In this
...rd, Druckcr has stated that symptomatic diagnosis--the method used by
t inanagers--is no solution. Instead he indicates that more time should
be spent on problem definition, and that this is begun by finding the "critical
factor."
This is the element (or elements) in the situation that
has to be changed before anything else can be changed, moved,
acted upon.
Isolation of the critical factor employs two subsidiary approaches from the
principle of "virtual motion." The first approach assumes that nothing will
change and asks: What will happen in time? The other approach projects
backward and asks: What, that could have been done or left undone at the
time this problem first appeared, would have materially affected the present
situation? A second step in this view of problem definition is to determine
the conditions for the solution in terms of organisational objectives . This
necessitates not only a knowledge of the objectives or goals of a business
but their prior establishment.
The words goals, objectives and purposes are used in this paper to
indicate organizational raison d'etre . Because of their importance to the
Tiaxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper and
Brothers Publishers, 1960), p. 116.





entire process of decision making, they will be discussed as they affect the
various stages of the process. One author has underlined the importance of
goals to our nation by stating:
We must understand the goals to which we as a nation
aspire or we x;ill not be able to create the resources to serve
these goals.
^
This statement points to the fact that efforts must be channeled in established
directions if we are to solve vital problems.' Objectives serve to set the
framework within which a problem is viewed. It is conceivable that two
organisations with opposed objectives not only would react differently to the
same conditions, but would take opposed views as to whether a problem situation
existed. Decisions made at any level within an organization should be made
in such manner as to advance the organization toward its objectives. Where
objectives are not well established, or are in conflict, there will be
differing views as to the seriousness of a problem situation. For the firm
interested in making a profit, the secondary questions of immediate profit,
long-run profit or a continuing rate of profit arise.
Before a problem can be defined, there must be an awareness of a
problem situation. It has been characterized as problem sensitivity. It may
be the difference between the successful executive and the "muddler."
Problem sensitivity is included in a larger stage which Simon has termed
"intelligence activity." He refers to it as finding occasions for making a
oJames M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Ap;e (New York: Harper and
Brothers Publishers, 1958), Chapter 7.
One method of determining whether a basic problem has been isolated
is to ask the question: Why? The answer should lead toward a particular
objective.
gSimon, The Hew Science of Management Decislon 1 p. 2.
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decision and States that executives spend a large fraction of their time
surveying the economic, technical, political, and social environment to
identify net; conditions that call for new actions.
Finally it should be recognised that all problems do not require
decisions. Drucker has suggested that effectiveness is hampered by spendii,
time on unproductive decisions. J He cites the example of status conflicts
where there is no right decision. In such instances it would seem unwise to
attempt any detailed problem definition. Further, it should be noted that a
problem requires solution only when there is a demand for a changed situation
or resistance against threatened change.
A bridge to the next stage of data gathering is provided by Tead:
One has to identify carefully the problem to be solved.
One has to becone steeped in all the factual data and their
implications. ^
Date Gathering
This stage in the decision-making process may be the most expensive
and time consuming. It is for this reason that many problems become stalled
at this stage. Where it is obvious that the costs of collecting data will far
exceed the benefits of a right decision or the disadvantages attendant to a
wrong decision, prudence would dictate that a minimum of information should be
assembled and a decision made accordingly.
^Peter Drucker, "How to Become an Effective Executive, ! ' Nation's
Business (April, 1961).
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StttSTITUIE? Una- else instead? Hfee* else instead* Other
lasrvdlMBtT Other aacerial? Other process? Other power?
Other place? Other approach? Other torn of voice?
SEaJEBiUflE? Interchange coiapoaeat©? Other pattern? Other
layout'/ other science? Transpose causa and effect? Outage
pace? Change schedule?
mm%m? Transpose positive and negative? How about
epaoeitaa? Turn it backwards? Turn it upside de*m? Reverse
roles? ®iae$s shoes? Tom tables? Tern other cheek?
Csmtm^ How about a blend, aa alloy, an assortsjeat, an
it Combine units? fiMMtM> aamasaa? Combine aaoeals?
tit***?*'
Group techai<$*es loir discovering alternatives include ?sbreimt©sains{ '
mx& "bam gMp|
»
*Btsiaete(s*a8?* leads itself to pzoblaa* of product
develepaeat m iaprovesaent , Tm purpose is to create a laood for the free
flow of ideas. She rules of «te&mmm*tmf are: (a) *judicial thinking is
not pemitfced, (b) suggestions are encouraged and none are regarded aa being
ridiculous, (c> a great quantity of suggestions are desired on the premise
that quantity breeds quality and the bast ideas seldo© came first. Advocates
of ' ,b*aiasfcemi»g** eedLieva- that the group process produces saore ideas than
individuals $«*rkin& alone since each ijlaa expressed saav su&&est a similar or
related idea to another parson*
"fern* groups** nave been found effective £or lar®e groups of 40 or
s»r© aha are attempting to discuss a eoaplcx problem. Xa order to get the
benefit of everyone's ideas m*& to promote participation, the large group is
broken into assail susauns not eseeecdina ei&fst aasihes's. Each ©£ the "hues
groups" is given a iiiaitod specific (g&eatlon, uhlch is a part of the larger
ww mun i , m in i mnw in » iinn m i i. iu . nn i « i»'». < nin imii i « I in ml » m i w»« ii i m «' un.»» iiimiMJ i i i « m mm i m i n im n mm 11 mum
l^AUnc Oabora, Azmi^ed JScaairinatign (Hew fork: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1553), p. 284.
is a technique invented by Alex Osbora and described
*?era originally developed by J. Donald
See J, :D*>nald Phillips, "depart on Bissssnsion o6, s * Adult Education
(7, 1940), pp. 181-182.
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9 consider* At the ea£ of about ten sainutes a spokessum designated
by each of the "buisa gBOup©' *** *» the ci • fc° tl» entire meeting.
Cue of the psrirxs values of this setfced is that each participant is required
to give special attestion to a phase of the ecsapi bleia and to oannlt
biaself orally*
The "scientific xaethod'* of looking at alternatives is to apply some
taaasurement of value to the predicted outcomes, in so doing the outcomes or
consequences may then be evaluated in tasne of the extent to which they
advance an organisation toward it*. objectives. This, as has been previously
noted, not only requires thx-: s/ss ^ fowwlatad and published but that
a relative &Mfc£c£ be assigned to them*
Value outcomes in evaluating alternatives requires oor
analytical el ,/uan any other phase of the deeisletraaaking process. One
of the ®&&t difficult problems, which is not alw, atahle, is that
acme alternatives do not have a common basis for comparison* The decision
maker amy then find himself facing •> choices afcailar to those posed by
the facetious quest is; i >uld you rather yams lunch?"
Husiaess organisations usually evaluate outcomes in cost or profit terms
based on historical accc data md its projection. Bowever, all
tives cannot he precisely evaluated in terms, particularly where
alternatives v/hieh affect objectives such as good will, Job satisfact:
safety, and other intangibles are concerned. "She ultimate aim of the aac
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, neverthele t evaluating intangibles, la
this regard, one author
S5mj reader should lie warned that: this is -.tot only the i»ut
ii-iportcnt pert *f .ualysie; of decision, but also the asst
difficult and aosc primitive «ith respect to scientific
developaent. Indeed, seas people believe that science can
never saafee such of a contribution to the problem, while others
strongly disagree, 19
In one study of a fcusiaess decision it was found that tbe evaluation
of alternative* is a crude, process.^ Xn sets© situations a choice i*as saade
het*?e©x* coveting alternatives uhile in others it 'tfas a matter of accepting
or rejecting a single course of act! ,.:.. sane choices -were made on the basis
of relative costs and savings while susse^ueat related choices 'were baaed
entirely on nonmonetary criteria. Xn evaluating consequences, attention
seewed to focus on the feesioi., alternatives where feasibility saeant:
(1) Is the aon* le for the alternative? (2) Xs it clearly better
than the. eari
The literature on decision asking is generally rather vague on aethods
of evaluating alternatives. In aore recent years it has b&m eustosery to
state th.- -nation Is assisted by tacthods mid techniques ouch as economic
forece
, nerfest projections, linear prograning and gams theory. 3* One
xaechod of weighing the alternatives Involves sis; steps* These are:
;. tteuw. gfagjUM^Bwar in Wmwmti #mwh mvm (m\wto
CHte» York: John Wiley and yens, I ) , n. 74.
.chard & Cyert, Herbert A. sisvsn, and Donald
." a Business Docisioa," Journal of Business . X&IX, 4 (1956),
pp. 237—
Z
2ithe ncjjer analytical techniques and theoretical approaches will he
discussed in Chapter VI.
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ttseovar the prenisca gecsaane to ms& Alternative. <Premises arc
de£ined as atatecsonts eonfcaiaias a description of both cause and result which
are decaed pertinent to the alternative being mrtnincd.)
2. .asperate the preaiaes pertaining to each alternative according to
whether they point to a desirable or undesirable effect la achieving stated
3. Check the validity of what neuld occur in case an alternative twore
adopted* Shis involves detemtuins whether the validity is manured by a
factual characteristic, an objective or agreed upon measuring rod; or by a
4* lest the validity of the salient preeaises,
Heigh the presdUes pertaining to each alternative with a view
toward ascertaining which one* will have the greatest inspect on desired soels.
Detenaine which alternative will provide the greateat total
aeBuat of wanted results and the least aoonnt of unwanted results. 22
Jhese aist step*; provide a s»r© rational saathod of evaluating Alternatives than
jud^nent based on experience, ^nether they will lead to proper evaluation
nay depend upon the degree of uncertainty Involved in each alternative And the
relative weights or ranking that are assigned. Evaluation aay ha suoaed up
by the statecaet..
Decision staking iaplies that there 0xe alternative actions,
Xa fact to make no decision is a decision in Itself. • . .
Hfre prohahle outcome o£ any deciaion usually receivea ouch
consideration. An atteatpt is xaade to predict conac<$uenca# and
then stake the decision that apparently will result in the events
that are judged heat for the organisation.^
in i n hi 1 1 h i ii i u'iiki i m inim in ii i n ii i tfmmmmu «mu n iii»»i»i»i i»i « <nmwn in i » i »i m in—m— i i i nmn
Z2tev^* ^mwUm HtwMim fiftiU»v pp*
^^Carroli L. 3hartle»
Cliffs t Haw Jersey: Frentiee*!
Wrol J c, ^M^ Efr^pWBBft, mi lataflfflMP (£»&*•






3hts step la the process popularly receives the nest attention because
It is the final taosaeat in the dec£:»lau-waki«s process. It is the step,
however, on vUich the least aoouat of tisae la required If the previous steps
have becta jwperly perforated.
Hhen an executive ashes a decision, there are usually a variety of
courses of action available to hln. Uouever, others in an organisation have
aia4e decisions which influence the available courses of action. Often this
occurs to the point that the decision oaker has only one logical course of
decision* 3he spastica than arises: Who has smde the decision? this concern
una voiced may Tears ago;
r.wch goes to contribute to executive decisions before the
part which the executive head takes in theaa, uhich Is indeed
eonatliaea merely the official promulgation of a decision, that
the conception of final authority is losing its force in the
And similarly*
an essecutive decision Is a aosseafc in a process, the growth
of a decision, the accusailation of authority, not the final step,
t» v&at ve need float to study. 2S
i2hc executive or jaanager does of course have the right to at^f y&s or
no to any proposed alternative* This involves sore than appears at first
glance, particularly %Jh&z\ it is realised chats
'»*« mi ni. HM.*» i m«n »im i i n ii im iwinn «i .im imr n n n mm»—m ik i ii hi > i nun m i n mm—mmm
m
mumm m » . mi.ii
^iary ?. Foliate, -'the Illusion of Final Authority," a pipex
presented by Mary Fellett at a fleeting of the "Taylor Society' (now the




The fine art of euet- -a consists in not dccid-
onestlons that are not not? per . , in not deciding prematurely,
in not making decisions that cannot be raade effective, and in not
aakiag decisions that others should aake.*"u
This statement suggests tliat decisions are not always nade logically on cold
facts and pure reaso;. . . - .-law has stated that anion xher
factors which ssust be considered are: the personal desires and goals of
tates, toe conflict of personal and cosapany gaala, cluing, and the
knowledge of when to fee prompt .and when to be deliberate. This view further
ste- •- an executive oust take risks courageousiy, without evasion, end
decide ..iterations are the oaat iaportant . * '
.iie rational decision making xaay be sought, the selection of a
course of action nasal.
.
U of an art*
It should be further noted that the steps in Urn caking are not
always fallowed in the once in which they have been presented. There is
often Touch back-tracking and, depending on the situation, certain of the
beginning and intenasediate steps laay receive no consideration whatsocn
Verio; totea aethoda containing fron three to nine or an ugee
have been devised. All of the MM contain the basic stages of problem
definition, altera. >, end eve us of alternatives. In this paper a
second of data $ and a final stage ion of a course of
action In addition to the I sriaary sta,.
mm——mm**m*~*mm ii <—^— m i i nil <i n i^^—m i» i m..i» »»—
—
a i i i ' m i »——i
n
i rum———
^Barnard, The Functions of the )B»ecutivo. p. 192.
^Ferrin Jtryker, ' .Hot an Executive Hafcee Op Sis . , ' Fortu—
(April, 1360), p, i .
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actives, purposes or j$oals oust be fcept in aiad when applying a decia.
saethod. Objectives are particularly fcajwrtaat to the framing of problem
defi i and the consideratii. .mativ .
In any decision lacthod it should be retaeabcred that aethodoiosy
should not be utilissc lenically or by rote. Decision cjetbods are ai
not ends to facilitate think!.. | decision. In problem
definition it is important it the cause of a problem rather than deal
with a syoiptQia. Asking the question "why?" often helps to determine whether
a pro m been isolated so that the problem ion will lead tov7a-
attainment of an objective. She second stage, data gathering, la perhaps the
mmt t&m consuming and expensive step in ;.-cisioo process. Probability
sampling is a ua t&»% in providing saeaninsful statistics -which describe
characteristics of a problem at lesser costs. An understanding of creativity
irf.il QpecA the search for alternatives, the third stage. Soste of the
techniques used in finding alternatives are check-lists, "brainstorming' 11 and
Tim fourth stage, evaluation of alternatives, is the roost
difficult analytical step. An adequate octhod of cossparins alternatives
•which involve intangible not been discovered. Part of the difficulty
scans fran organisational inability pr ives and to
dec their relative precedence in particular probloos. In evaluate
alternatives an effort should be oade to differentiate "fact 5 * and "value"
eooalderatior.. . .lection of a course of A m fifth stage, is I





there bavc been previous references to group decision unEing end scsae
of the group techniques \&ich any be applied. Xa general, however, previous
chapters nave eaphasiacd decision making fcy individuali. . Our dealers
society places great isrportaueo on wise group decisions. It fti important to
understand then how the federal @<mrttfflenfc sad business and industry make
decisions in tae group canriroaraent
.
Group taatwgeewBt has increased tremendously since chc 1900 'a. It has
fctfM mpiftiaad aj fatllWH
As soon a* a aawgar is forced by she growth of his ceopeny,
the variety or oocjpleKicy of its prods •. ie slsaplc
gMgNpitle separation of Its plants to establish bread policies,
.aasegy, and nvl i ...as-^thea the manager
finds hteseU in conference with bis peers.*-
.iaatione are the answer for probieess too cooplcss to be handled
ae individual. T.' .a* from the limited isanory, short spaa of
atteutian, and overall physical limitations of oao persoa to consider, decide
and cotaauuicnte oa a myriad of large end small problems. Consequently,
anicctica by function has bean toe basic method to (I) break dove problems
into exponent parts
, (;:) to assign the responsibility for dealing with the
—
w
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segaent* to various levels and specialised units, and (3) to coordinate these
separated efforts in a process of osr^aadLsatioaal decision and action. 2
i the srovch of organisations and the coapleaity of problem it
has been necessary to utilise beards, councils and cosaaittess to aeeeopiish
been defined?
Discussion is oral, involves a s«>upf involves interaction,
purposeful* md proceeds systematically • Hobbers tattat accept
saroun ar Ienta£ lore—»%oftsidot ^hafc is in the best Interest of all
or asst nasbcrs. ?3«tboda and ends considered appropriate are
dctcrnined by the attitudes, values, and objectivec of tbc group.
Stoblesa solving discussion is a phase of a larger process,
deliberation. It say be represented by a eontinuuet similar to the one







The delibcretiea. eoatiauiaa would be eoe&iete if decision could be reached
threugfc this -Jiscv .-seas. This is not the ease. It cmuc be recognised
%Jeitsei. Bac&aroufid for Decision Hakims, e* !•'; .
%albert E. Ouliey, fflMjato*., WflII*gffi jj^ tottft tom& (Hev York:
Henry Salt and Co., I960), p.

6*
pr .is proper, they occane
Xho vteb&t&r fo#f rss».




srcAch a 4 i acceptable to MM% is? *e g*c
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im*ta»co. ftj&eww earw .^c? ranter* apprise*' of current
hfljgM ... ...... , . b pawn Met «,..-.:•.-. Let ,..,-... - &eii tapeat, £a pvestij it
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caoaapilficc' h$ a description of the President's vaeefcly Cabinet tacetinga:
These discussions, as boat, bring out ttseful information
and opinions, clarify the issues, «ad promote raralc ansng cite
co|j asceeutivas of the Administration. Airxast never do they
euUiiaatc In aeeisiona on policy i>y xaere show of hands.®
, .^V...: .,.„,- ,.._-
A ausber of achraiitasiw are daisied for group action. It is
aainftaiaatf that there id a stronger coredtramt Co decision A&an those affected
have participated In its forailatien, While a single executive can task© a
'W»* ** ** ** * ** ^»'$a»aiw ^^ai^Wwawaai^awfriewi'-we at^* •wwpP^p^w^hs*''w*^fra ••*«• ^i^aaai^r •'^^^^^wa^w^c ^fcasw^ ^••^afc^'^'e'^wffaii^we*'""****"
aa£ baci^isj^md considerations are better understood but because Chose charged
with taploatRta&iea am w&m involved in the decision, they are, therefore
,
usually oore willing to do the necessary work Involved in Cha execution of
A decision to aalee it a anceeas* A slsdlar view was expressed last fall:
An asapleyee's participation la decision soaking and his
ci$$fc to quant:, <3MQr Mi essential In creating a
y • -,.-.' ati
i
ta**fl .. . . :•;.; - , bard f\m1rmm
r Conpasgr, £fc&? Vork t In Sa4aatr,ial fla*—'«*gf
a licCo-ssaid; Ifeltinlc tiaaagejaeac Plan Is one of the outstanding
exanples of i -.cccss through she participation of eiapioyaea in
mmtmmmm m « »» m mm ill « m m mm i ii inroiiwii in i n i nww—»i^»««»—»»^iii |i in mm. » m i n i n « im>»—»i i n i. i m i i—«»i»»—
«
— iii III n »«-w«
(Hew Vwfca Applatoa-Cent'or^ * - I.
7 '
fiiMMiiiiiiiiwi[|B|i; ajpyjUBw (Aeaeriena Kenasasnent Association, ft
^Charles
,
.::«& Sowar of the gooals (Stew Ssrks Harper and
fieothars ?uhilsfcers, 1949) « p. 17.
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Uwi&, partictpatioiv *£ir»&i», Emigrating acw eiavuagr ouapuiucaticrn
between all erapXoyees eat* nanagnw-ttt. Ii«iy Ismevaaaata and tnaovationa have
It is believed that $KKtp8 ^ro&tec feet -ility decisions than




ere composed of spectoiiata •representing Ui£'£crcnt areas of kraw'ierf@e along
.a general officers *&e represent ebe corporation as a wnole, Each pseoeota
then asrt out tlje fact and value paMmiae* of the various alternative* and
*•** mi a ******* « actum.* $mm m**m* m* mm m
(i) m iaasaoe .: £a* gro
eeopL .ccaaa&my xaey be
41.:. ante c.
^actaai fc iagr result in "aitarnanins
.
. jprysalue am: tiP are thereby
c ,ay in arriv-
bwU*
..•ikailar to ttsoan
unieh nay aceoutt ,.. .. ..^ the
,...."...'... tm a2tmom& that sphere* ef ees^tenaa* ocsaauaitafttiaa aai
»i imm iimn «»>«. — m HM—iim in » mi l »»>i « wmm im «»»«——» » pi hi m mn» n «»l i « ip—mo— lum p «i » »i lum «——»»»—
3»V JtaaJaaaaaea Hake Deciai i " ^rtftina (Aug
, ftrthnwM art flswra 3imw» p.
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information, and motivation account for the behavior of a political unit.H
This hypothesis led to the formulation of a number of propositions regarding
decision making in the U. S. House of Representatives Rules Committee. 12
These propositions are:
Propo s it ion 1 .
1
When the spheres of competence of a
decisional unit are not explicitly or completely prescribed,
individual members of the unit are required to interpret their
competences for themselves.
Proposition 1.2 When spheres of competence are not clearly
defined, diverse loyalties compete for an individual's allegiance.
Propositions 2.1 and 3.1 A decision maker interprets his
competence in terms of his information and motivation.
Proposition 2.2 The greater the prestige of and respect for
the sender, the greater is the impact of the information on the
recipient.
Proposition 2.3 In any organization, an informal
communications network grows up around the formal structure.
Proposition 2.4 The less the flow of information iron
system sources, the more reliance will be placed on information
within the decisional unit.
Proposition 2.5 The greater the dependence on information
within the decisional unit, the more relevant is the previous
experience of the decision maker.
Proposition 2.6 The shorter the period for decision, the
less thorough the search for information.
Proposition 2.7 There is a point beyond which further
consideration will not yield additional information.
Proposition 3.2 The values and objectives that guide
individual decisions in organisations include organisational
values and objectives.
Proposition 3.3 The values and objectives that guide an
individual's decisions in organisations include his previous
life experience or social background.
Proposition 3.4 Organisational values and objectives may
conflict with non-organisational values and objectives.
Proposition 3.5 Resolution of conflicts between organizational
and non-organisational values depends on one's estimate of the
strength of the competing demands.
Hh. W. Bmck and Burton Sapin, "Decision Making as an Approach to the
Study of International Politics," (Princeton, Hew Jersey, 1954).
12james A. Robinson, "Decision Making in the House Rules Committee,"
Administrative Science Quarterly (June, 1958), pp. 473-493.

2!a3&e proposition. .>verasaental political unit,
contain &coe interest., regarding &roup e2ecision xaaking. Some of
ion of ttt .- ,©ua, Ikavrcver, it has
often been ahotm that the obvious is t&. -bvioua as was first supposed or
the .J docs ao
assurscc. fia s tliat the individual saaobers of
the . vc little instruction &a£ are subjected to
vsriou
.
>ups $£ .u CoEsauaicatioa
clianae... - ' . coiapeteace, eft eat ootivatioaa
are to ceqply tfifca party's leadersaip.
influence;' a information au<3 fcfe .>r«F Is usually recei,
fro-v leadaxaMp by informal eosaauni infonaation
not received fros any 4a n ebauuei, oe&bers oust rely on tbeir
MpArieiicfe&t, inferences frees similar events, and sua values anc
&9, Kiia factor of oV ffl$ taay permit predict ion of a laes&er's
behavior if eao.. kaotm about t&e ws&k ,..od t eoucation,
experience, attitudes, etc. Hearings ualc over several days revealed that
there ;;as a point at t?hieh ao additional iaforjaatic ./otaiaeu, only
repetitious questions and a: . Coaal values are predominantly
ia the area of cooperation. A pungent I jm attributed to the late
Speaker Saybura is: "& get along, 30 along." to resolving conflicts between




Whether the** proposition** are eewp: applicable to bujiaaaa and
;.-.: ..../ .•..- iliC r.'ii'i. -v'. . ::v.L:.Cw Ntta* kfci; fttt HKpMMfl iMHRfet HM9 An pWV&ii
mm telieafc W teigAifixaiaoe of agfteses of essqpeteaee, iaforssatioa and
activation i» group deck, As south &my ^sstaix, greater insight into the
jmimtiwiti o£ ../•'.•-,/ jbmH " „.-:_...
$wa JLar$t oourceis of variables are *ai<d to account fox* interactive
properties aaa* situational variables,^ Perooaai variable are:
(a) TUe mtt-mwfF of raievaat iaforoetioa easU person poa$ea&eo aa*I liis
aeceea to pertinent oattriala,
(!>) Saefc peraoii*^ ability to roaoau.
(a) Bach fWftMftl articaletioa--bfa skiti Ei| laa@*a®* aad
itwwMiiliiiitlia*
(t!) Saoh peroof**^ ethical ista»>3ar«&.
(a) The ©stoat to tihicfc eadj peroon toads to be &txLaaat or auhoi&aivc*
Group properties ene situational variables which affect interaction ares
(a) The type of group.
; Tae setitre of the ggoap*» eaik or goal t
Co) XUe tine available for che dt&eueeion.
(a) Oroup aona or standard
iaaitioy, ^rswtoft. Wftjarei «jj ffamitr trowift* i *

Ail of these personal and flp km are v. . Coasecjuently,
generali.. In saade about every discussion m involving every
type of person.
. afoaafcfth - 1 ctp ft*;,.
1
There ere jusaexou.. vision oaking. & us*
1 lie restricted to signet . . . ..a disadvantages will
no-: . . -atered or where pre|>arat£oas have been oade to ntafealae these
disadvantages. First, discussion la always Sitae conauoins. Eacb aeaoer ie
£ having his '-'say." Xa taost cases there are no short cuts to avoid
this occurrence, and it is often necessary- ill. and cotaplcte understand-
Further, laany persons feel they cats v. an isapressiaa, on their hoas or
others, even if they only elier ia. 4l££er* . >sn %/hat isay have already been
aai<-. -..-ood, discussion is often we .. "there are usually false ste.
and ssany un$»roductivc explorations. Ax' :aian H iMft
diaeovcrcd that the tproup baa no authority to do anything ifc*Mt a particular
probXesa, or that a« ansver is oeltbc led nor desired. Third, sion
can after a point heceaae a substi: Sat action. Calling iaoetings and
attend ora can heeotae an addiction - mfo that other duties
axe severely magic. I . Fourth., discussion can be. indecisive. Sesponeihiiity
for action any be ao va^te that no en© -qetatjer can he singled out as the cause
of the delay. In other situations tm c-ppe I aay sjxiit the group to
the detrisieat o£ any sort of unity of action. Finally t roup saay be so
-vutad that setae taatahe;.' I not speak because o£ social or sta~
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m&m and fear o£ disapproval. Helpful criticise* and valid objections,
;li nay eeee Co light after a plan is executed, ore withheld vfoen vast
Hi
an or ;Ion there are various levels of individuals and
groups who ere engaged in various stages of the decisioa-Eaaking process. At
die lower levels, policies and higher level instructions enable groups and
io. io aalse dec: c fretae of reference supplied them.
Sol -ally are . :> prov. ..ioaaee for repetitive situation*
ave previously occurred and .i&ely I; aia in the future,
re aoaprc i situations arise, it say happen that the problem is passed
to the hierarchy of an organisation for dc<
CSjart 1 show a laodel cycle £ »rfsaiaati«aal operation.
upward steps here of raw information, processed inforoation, professional
JmtypN ( ;aad roe *ibed
in <3ocis: .lag saothods. Toe dout&?ard steps are those concerned in the
on of a decision. It should be noted that die logical starting point
.- situation, However, information seraetiaes reveals a situation, action
in one situation uay som
i
create another, etc. Within an organisation
the various steps are vaost often performed by individuals «ho ccsapr
functional groups for fcue atated purpos


























































She am/ analytical teel»fc$iefi and theoretical approaches soemplify
fcoc3ailque& arc liaesr programias, quaing tbeory, probability theory,
ccraauaicesiogt theory, end gs&tfft theory. Providing the principal impetus babied
a&st of ttoafi tectia&iuas aad theories is tbe giant of this a$ge» tb© cosaputer.
Tills chapter »ill remss? tbe atrcrsgtfei aad lasalcaassas of these new teebni iua*
wA frhyf.r cootribut&aiisj to decision xaaklag*
It «as previously observed tbat decisions «ay be progranned to the
extent that tbey are repetitive, routine and definite proeedurea, usually
palicie; Mil MtllMfci ievci IftflCCMfl&iiMMi IMMp hUH ^.r^vi-dcu 0*1 a frarsc of
&*tHm&i^pM&9'!&0tifr''& ***•**••^j» ^^w^"M*^M^,'S'WPaaa^ a^e*s^ ^aa* *^*%paa' j 'WPwr ^r^s^a* m. w* ^^yaaiy^i^wpMwwaaa* 4MHMe "i#~*jBajj wa *p
33 nonprosrsEped. Chart 2 contra .'^granaad and nonprogrsBDed
decisions in tbe traditional and aodera decS^to-^aking techai^uaa
«
1 Tbe cbart
la sel£«a^>Laaatary vita tbe possible exception o£ "beuristlc prablea-oolvins
techniques • k1 "Sbis refers* to diceoverins how our tsental processes function and
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usins the information About these processes so that ye can teach a eian or a
nael -at he he has to proceed in or solve
problcs_ia relatias to various subjects. An understanding of i of
problems ft i operation., arch is being applied provides a better
understanding of Che utility of I .chaiqu.
Various definitions of operations re in available, une of the
norc coiitprehenaive definitions states that the characteristic, jug
**aeareh
.-.
cd to par; .
<b) Sfttfeajftafctott of operations to obtain greater assurance
of hot. -aagc as-h/aatagaa for an organisation.
(c) Application of the ao-jest scie.... i aods and
teeimi i as linear prograatxtag, ^atae theory and
infors.ic.u_
(cl) .onsloa of tli® m . . and techni-jwes
of the older immgemnt
(c) Di tt and nit of analytical laodcis in the laaaacr
costaou to the basic ^cieacas.
(f) Design and use of experimental ope
.
-bat give an
in ;.ato c.- -f actual operations.
Cg) Use of i i ;_;;ive ;^ilti-di|cipiinary
;_o aolve cosaplci. aperational proble...s.3
tChasc characteristics re. :<'Jtditional .. First,
Qperai-. m entity, "Toe subject art**** studied is not
the e<|uipjacnt used, nor -rale of the participants nor tiie physical
pro;.- - 1 tlte <mtgwt) it li the combination ! . .~>e in total, as an
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> 9ffffifEfr>qff gpffiefflfsh for WWMMHPtf* Edited by Joseph F.
McClosfey arid Florence £!• Tr a (Baltimore, ISaryland: She Johns Hopkins
Press, 1954), p. xi.
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mmm*mmm.<* m*«mm*mmm*m tmm mm &*-
It raemd &&lgoiag the oooponeattt of a aystaa and Kicking individual
- ji-w yrtt&ia It in fct»o Htgjtoft of the implication of theo© decisions for tint
ayuccd as s \As>l .
In fcciir.au of rfc©aatf«&* these are fcnoo* Wta fe&l too "faaatrcfc" la
tyg^JQjg ooro £nan t&e too. j.yat^saa£ic» lo-gical end tuftfaffffif f.yaft analysis
M««^ M«***»|l_1II**-*» MM* With *to
amplication of -scicntiflc Sietfce<l to istwagBBftttt problem. Consequently, it
advanced saal&OEiatto, ffsotiarick Xaylor la bio 'seieiitifie sasnagoaeni; vaa
.;:..,_ ..:.-' .-,a:x ;-);,_.;,..,.•,, . . . pfftM :. .:..r ::::::. m. feRIMfi HMMl gMMi hfel bcci:;
the esspliasis on fclss s&slti&i^oiplinacsy apisrsaoa and the eontrio&fcions of fcho
"twnr^rial ociaoaea*"
^nolyise- the seiesstifie aetlaed* eszohasis la pl&eec' oil the analysis
o£ data* Eiis step fellowa jiravious steps of: (I) ebaervatloa oad general
auvvey of dsn pfoMaa area, (2) definition of the prohlaa, am! (3) foot
findings In anely: ^sasis is f>Xeco& eat
Ix2) IPfoft isolation Of fflfttfcOBTOf Of trends. .
(3) 3S*e aetemiaat csmo and offoot relationships.
relates the critical variables to given patterns of interaction. Hhrce kinds
of saodels taay ^o hull
^fesnrll C. £&rssaaaa and John ?. Haaan* "Qaamtlnae Research for
**»""' g««^gd BBO«
ffiffiffi ^MTYlffifi -sxi» * (1953), p. 101.
Sc. tJcot <Su'jc£ciaos Ifciooel U Setoff and E. Leonard Arneff,
OttO^atio^l ffiBiMWHll ^Minf V®^ &&& i«THey and ^a»» Inc.,









tt> SfQQfc • a literal pictorial repreaeatasloa of certain
aspect* which arc ©object to aetrlc trass*
arc m4el car* or airplanes bails: to scale.
t&tem - thiaei are uses to *tMt for ana tffHMK
et&er
el. ty e&araixig tkrowgb wires*
£3) ^g^^lgf - oynbola arc ua©d to stand for sorae otber
propc. sootleal «patie«s or int^uat
,
aKK&el. _;ital ee*a$otar© because of :
clam ana tbelr reiieace on probability ehac
Lie all three taedeis amid be usee1 as one, it la amtaoal for operations
rosea, y iconic nasals* la solving eynboiie models there are tbree
ne&tiseas
(couatiag)* In so doing, trial aa4 error la employee
1
and approxiraatiotui are
saode to get closer am! clsser to the answer,
i^*^** —^wpstpwfwe "W^iwak-vw nfaiwnsaawpwpi^^pywffe w% aw ^^ws>'»esi> <aKeai3p*n4w*npaew^^Mi se^ffliw^a ^w^^f •^^•ww*^"* ?s*wi
involves atoaftoaeic variables, these idem;ify a selection from events aad
la nflitlcfe the outeasaes arts 4ffpffwlftr>t one oa fcba other iss twMgiatf of probability.
Osaxa of tba pr&aary a^vaata^aa of a css^utcr la ita large nenery,
£ihere &bc «nfMTfift contains both status data ant! the laws v&ieb describe tbe
system's behavior, the machine can sasSse prediction. Sfei* ability enables
the Cv3c?>. stl eattcaslvely la engineering and the physical aeieaees




to study the behavior of compi individual elements of the
problem and their interactions can be understood and represented in a simple
way, but where the behavior of the whole system involves so many simultaneous
intc ,-as that the human mind cannot grasp the whole. ^ This leads to the
question of models and understanding. A simple model that can be understood
conceptually provides insight into the problem of bringing out the relations
between inputs or assumptions on one hand and results on the other. It
possesses the disadvant£, tat£ the problem is oversimplified and lacks
realistic detail. A big detailed model will provide little conceptual insight,
It will contain a large number of assumptions (many of which are highly
conjectural) and the relationships between input and output will not be well
understood. In these elaborate simulations there is the danger that an
executive may depend on computerised decision aids without realising how much
human judgment has gone into making such aids useful to him. The defenders
of big detailed models state that simulation should not be expected to give
precise predictions. Bather its value is heuristic and educational. If this
is so, it would seem that the proper procedure may be to build a simple model
and gradually add detail as understanding develops. ®
Essential to the mathematical logic of the model is a consistent
statement of the objectives of the operation.*- Operations research can be
applied to a situation and predict consequences of various alternative courses
Thornton Read, Command aud Control , Policy Memorandum 136. 24








*£ acfcioB. 33a» «lte3faat -: , ^0rnmv$ m ' various
., m£ «m tlMi ass&pula&ioa of di££©peaa£ aiiagX** varial>le £acfc«,-
• ffim met of 4eel*l0» remise
It. smb? && 6fea«xve<& ttoa tla«£: cwmafttioiM r^s&asrcb M^rks bv seeking to
*<&*#**> *$*? iim&m*l*!#ii":iG'A in gji!B8»*»<mM^ siiadais &c£ivl&i&&* This usualIv takes
pw&&®.®B Ts&dgi. .ictid« 'It z-rfffiwfr ttaXila*: it a sasUtssa c«aa fca
?'.$m£ s&l&ti&a&ft fsafttsaan Sfect tk&sisaa asusl aJNUxacfc £3?oei &3ia 4frfr-ftl,tft
gwttHunu Tic m of pa£fea*a* smss&t &gfwss<i asacaitially oa ta*
aa*2y&& tj|» t&ea feuttd* a §®*Sal* Oonfotttrft per: N> aervica «4a




, && •teia&sm flaking, ^p^tmis^m tmmstik m^ixm that:
(I) 1 .-jx! £»•..
) SSso aieu«?
active wat b© iK t&suu of yhieli
in be Btti$Ktldpfc
ac «f J**S&l£&g the fa«or»
Ick
-.it tain
:;be data ass£ usually h&
$$& i^aaaaswtli ai*p3P8*a^i ts& p8K>' ~aa ba a ^iiaalfieaafc <
;/>s$*$&®ti&s&g ftssMsaaa in 4aggf sssp^tetifc:- It $assai£a aBaalysis
28?akXissi» a&&2 £&& &ia£lifi.£a£l&& of nt ff^ymtsIwg > Xs* $a 40'iskg it i&dicafcaa frfog-






operat&oaa reaaars?a, ab fcave iinitation» , which
uben r. :£e£8Sk that hm been attaociated with the
.
*•*- tea tec. ..solve
.
*•« It dbes- .^liae the problem or
.3 abo. i . v-es swat be eat bed
ea£ sot i
ft bunaa decision saafecr. !££«£0e UttUatieas will lift observed la the
for analysing
..:,.. .-.: iati .-;«'.':.'.;• ?;. sr^is&lc Uit v;&ita&lly *.&;•* ..u.'. ..' :.-. ^icor-j 1a order to find
i enablae . -. . It !a a t te detersiiii*
the eptir&sa t?*y to taae resourcee. It esjeioyii linear e^utioas subject
limitations placed or oriablea v&ich are accurately town. recuaiq,uea
jenesalls &tt hign-speed canpttexs. la industry liaear
pregpracrsia^ h«« been allied to determining optissua eolation* for planning
achedaiias and far certain production an4 inventory ;
a ae&hod of analyse . .ore is a lock of tfcalag
between arrival, at acsac point in an operation, of a 3es$uenec of units taaA
the subsequent diapaaal of the units. Conee^ieatly a <$ieue or smiting line in
Caiaaed. the central problem is one of the relationship between the laean
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of the waiting line and the degree o£ randownaas of arrival and disposal.
A formula which tfbMi th qe of having n. units in a waiting line is:
Pn « <A/S)
n 1 - (|
snares A • taaaa arrival re.
3 * s&an disposal race (asswtaed larger than A)
tthexe both arrivals and departures axe random the "$4onte Carlo** method for
solution is etapioyed. It uses tables of tgwliw numbers and empirically
13determined probability distributions.
Queing theory baa found considerable use in staff planning. It vas
originally developed to solve certain probleas in en automatic telephone
switching system. Subsequently it has bean applied to airline traffic and
industry production problems.
Probability theory *kk >ao of the contributions of sta-
te Chapter IS. Essentially it involv- - .Jietiana of the likelihood
of the occurrence of certain variables in various situations. Probability
theory usually forms a significant part of many models. Its use in operations
ve&earch is not only the. relation between augers, as in statistics* but to
permit an understanding of the operation which the tmxabora represent. This is
^Sfante Carlo;) method tags taeationed briefly in this chapter in
section with solutions to symbolic models.
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done by predictions which contain uncertainty ranges. One of the cioro esoteric
use -i*obability has been in W analysis*** tli. „ca of locate - uaga
in a specified area or under specified condition* .
.plittg theory has «3 vieualy csentionad. in operations
applied primarily to the data-gathering function. This
laatbeejatical technique c. g .taaaicai end i :ive *?ay of obtaining
j lea w.-. -ovide reliable indications of the decision parameters for
-; very essential end useful tool.
Shis is one of the ©ore recent techniques whicS* is considered a aajor
fan --ugh in taaae^isaeat science. It i& a laethod for the study of decision
making ir >ioas of conflict yfaere rivalistie behavior brings about
; behavior, the theory of seaes is concerned with choosing eoong
alfec i I of action. 2a so doing each opponent desires to obtain
rsmiaaa tin only the mfwfaaWB which an opponent iottn .
. to th o8x*mxisMt return concept.
3tu I to votfe -lehieve as xsjeh es
poi.-. Into account the'... ft&t others uhouc
3vc an effect on all.
A c m zaefcer in a ^ane faces a eto>< 'fmcyoei .aiiastion
problcES. Be ABM an optica . ,*n, ta. :.nto
eecouat the peg 1c act - oppoBente.^*
*%artin (MS of Gaoe Theory in lie?.. it Science
'
'"" iT 'iiiV- '
? "
:
TflttUKT *~ • 7 Frcsaant A. Shall, Jr. (Hkxaei^ood,
&i£.*jis: lUchJifci H. Irlin, Inc., 1953), p. 157.
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V. :...,:.:.^ -.' ':;':.« aaciudl 4»W«0tt«t4oo th«t» if OgpMlltf ifftif
«et rationally to ac&ieve tlafcir object ivetf, am be eat ' l» a Esamrlcal
scale of espaetai! aefcuras (usually isatria: forsa). 2etv .11 vary according
;Iic auoct ..fcenmfcivos wfeen eppeaiag o** eppenea,
aaativee* lot . >aa tbe appropriate strategy for each nixie am be
eaoseuted ffliB^fiiWiwt^fiiTiiliifi^i "She ruieo of the sane 42% fdtvsa la atfvaace end arc
not uasler else eaotrol of film plsyv
Appiicatiost of the timer, -cal situations is lifted to &m*pereea»
oea»»*«B aoaeoUuoiw. gsasea, la simse aituationi ubat one person or
organic*^ iori looas the other person or orgt :*a gain*.
nmrpeae* gaae theory yet a €ocag?iecoly actory
tool, Xt &** oo&e smxa ©scpli&tt t£m $»emm involved ta passes or situations
rategiea, la this way it stay ig?ai£i«#at aid to
:,m of ateettmoie aoopufe.
(1) It can psoccu^ date for pva&tecs&md purposes at agaaffing epeeoe~»
in soae MSA mill. ' a oaaoad par operation,
(2) It plays a pre*4ecisional sole by storing, handling, aanipolatins,
cad parforsaias calculate. .
and rules Sor uae» by coaparias varteua ways of namlpulatias variable* and
indicating tim optlmm alternative. Eaaeatially tUio t& tbe atop previously
referred to ao ©value/ : alteraativ
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) It can play a post-declalonal rale by measuring x*esults, noti
changes, and pravi
'
-aaagaflrat with inforssation about variations £roa
... .
In all of tiio above rolos tim computer isaplies a dc ft l:rou intuition,
gpoMrae and hunches co cjuatititative hi mini milMlrf as a basis for decision and
action. tftllffill It should bo noted that an electronic computer can do better
any .,overwx o£ hmt complicated the rul
. In uncertain. :.oa.«., i •..:, be mode IP to use
huaan abilities or .. suputer.
HOB of the limitations of oxaputera which mat ttf understood to
obtain useful results are:
(1) A tendency to feel that resul frost assumptions and
calculations have a reliability uhich is sorae sort of average of that of the
dub: ... sputa and the accurate calculations.
(2) Hany inputs are highly uncertain. •
(3) XI: has i:he advantage of making its synthesis without
pora&nol bias froa ..:itions~»'it etiainatcs personal bias. It also
tends : any alloi/aaces for the personal, biases ol the inputs it
16
In thiii Jisrtc vein it has been reported that:
Band scientists have concluded that no decision nechonisci
ear. . -otoly escape tfc- .c uncertainties
md m that pi M o£ decision.
*%80g»ga . It seaas that if




an. &sps»va tha wrcbo&>i»£y of
- fflNMat ana aouadl
Cwapufcors ata usad to porfosu a reyriao; of tasfca in Qpvnraaaafc and
j»eaa and industry. &jesa u«c$ have bmm gam 2*t«soriae*5 in two
ways . F£ *iw?£o« routine clerical operations E*3r© efficiently than aaa
been ;> - vltiicttt th© aid of such a EsacJUna. EsanplaA arc billing
tact:' -•jyroil cessations* and individual bank balances. Second, to
-^a^^wv^* for^nr^*wi^(B*^iia iaaw«wawiw aifrw **» v*pw aif'^PMMiaii*' a»*aBaw^BwpjHPwiaffifr wa ^***,,it^ |ar *"j^ a*-^ ii»-<*.awa* w^a* .a***" aawaa* ^^*4iiotwrtw^wiwwMBk
and tc: An esoop i was the asaples prosraa naGO*




I A ware witaia tUc l&aita ublch wuld parsit orbital
Eae develojaaent of taa eeg^atar am, &g aa? analytical
teefsai^u, .* systeias which can pso&see twra and mre
«a*t fca Iq" a uniform proaaaa of handling data. It bagisa vlth
input; to storage, tibau control and proeaaalag, md finally an
output la si ?be sa&snanlsatioa. of ass? aart a* the infon3ation«>decldion'a
action c.; '&a&a 4&%?n taa assisting tflawarffYtyat
i
ow chaaaeltf to tjhica taaaber*
« *i i m « iLii n ii. ii. ii i ii *i)mmmM*mmmm*mmimmxwi h .hi. iimw—
—
ww nm i.i.i—www—hum irm i n in immn . in
*%teSenaXd» ffanw Suaianaaaen Hak- p. 114.
. Q&zz . U ISrowalea, '^atltassatiea for Decision lials
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animation arc: aceuatowad. la particular, inform! eo&Duaicationa
tend to disappear aa£ a&aeliiaas 4o m>c automatically replace: 1. . '..-we
in£-:.- ' -as, the concept of an organisation aa
an Infoztaa&ion £lo- .'.3 in ^©eiaion t&aoxy. Za organisation
.is of tauauKUMti&a exist at; tbarae 1c
can the ojcbols of eoecMnieaiioa
.tte4? <TIio technical problem)
iaely &» the tta&acttttttd ayn&oia convey
iro4 saaanins? (The seaas-i
;
C, H@w ef£actively does the received weanim.;
.
ees&set in tlse gittdl w. "te effeetivwaeao pxoblas).'
.we fck. iifc&Ksatian, re&areleaa of
its ixiani omaaittad froci a sender to a receiver. Seaantie problem
asm concerned wica die interpretation of matting by a ret a* coc^arci
wifcU tk& iatanflari m&m&a® of the sender. _ , .cetivaaec - Lecta are concerned
m extent .:.ea tbo saeeains eeaveyed to a receiver produces the
ceBduet tfcsairoit by tfea &entk . "".a re-cognition of fc&eae proeleos has l«*f to
the fasaulacioa of s«thc©eticai tneores;. 1 .ruling the rate at which
iafosaation ssay fc* traaaaittod aa*2 have m arbitrarily tar ff««2seacy of err
Xoproveiaeata in. the Uaadliag; of information nave the -
'
await ti , ..:;,,.:-, cantraii at&aa ': oa-therity, fa© iopaefc on fia^iai^ -a;.:.,;
agios teefasv :;Os^sr. resent otive
I a pre4iction i
.-ana* Illinoiv ' Illinois' ?rese,

Levels iiiu beosae





,ra": 1MB c-5 .. .^WVfcffrty Mtf B&ftff
K>rrliK>»e. the bfcSfc answer until
gem' - -w iafeaasfcion teefanalogy
aaises I -iiiate tUo rial: of
:«S cos.x5jaiic«.s;iaQS,
id £; susduratiBat
"'.; o£ &>&€&& o£ Lint: £Std <*£&££
aovitt aa£ !Stwta<u L,
-^ ftf$fr"h •*** - C. Lssake and Japes
s Ciwt,.
,
Msrrill Saoks, 2ae.» 1361), $>. 7 .
£n£or»atiost tecbnelosy is deflate in the reference «s Ubv. <j&r8c rx.
-ut the «ystMBKati« ss&nipulc; I iaffoRaatioi;

cumEavxx
Oust Uewic ta0trt66.. ^tderataadias decision mte&a® i& provided by
tit- Uahcasi 4I*cipU&ea« They have coxierlUitad not only to dceiaiua
ieiai/m wttexia U;t arc integral parts c-£ sbc latordiaclpilaary
8p$ .-he neyer aaaXy al^uoa ami theoretical a^raaeh&tt. Xa
great Measure tfce older . : : are £ou»d in. all of the recent cootaaporary
n®r!:. ,ie and t&e acieistifie raetW of ^iiX^iK^ifey pelade aX! '.?liaaa
aad xx&rar apggsac&ea to deal?tea aofeia^ suck aa operations scacar< .
;, . . / '-c imm pwwKi • totat&fev ..,. .; :... wimfa pmA&m Mttygftg afttati
will pemit the teae&i*y <sf aethaua for ssolviag certain type
Eecwsssaies had contrikAts^ $aae theory; sate al has contributed aaapiiag
Deelaioa tlieory provides concept* to lie uvtefc aatl ^tizaulatea
-IdMk& hn total &&ieiaa>«aakiBg arena, DcdUiitMi raetbj&s are
z&xaez be used waciwttU ially -seat aaaaurc:
creativity. Croaa <3eeisi4Ma saakiag is a atw^y iu s^eiaX payefoiogy witb lea
enpbaate es» £&g sad aocieiegieai problem,
I!be assy aoaiytieal tcelxai^tjea wvff tlsaorotleai appxoacl&ce are Isapcrtaat




laakiao, however, since their function la a supporting one. It is tl*e
raspoasiblXity of the decision oaker to insure that the ncv techniques are
brought to bear ia a coatrolled way.
Xt should now be apparent thai: aa be improved throueh
to | many disciplines, theories, ucthoda and
,i, in addition, a decision canker ulwu..,
(a) Develop problem sensitivity through auareac**.. cjnviroacjent,
kit .ligation's objectives, and the relationship vhich Ms organisation
political, social end cconooic events.
(b) Apply rational nsetlaode to problem anal je alert to detect
ids mm and others irrationality and oiaaea.
(c) Seek a wider range 0$ ft -ace and knowledge so that his
deciai. - increased and proved. This should include the
ngths and Iftaitati the aaaer analytical teebais&ta* and theoretical
(d) Develop creativity in d a shaking, ijarticuiariy in necking
(e> aece-galxe that there ia a variety of epproac: decision
saakiag. They include: (X) intuition and hunches; <::.'- .catcd pre:. sal
jud&aeut; (3) foxsaal yet fiessitsle decision netboda; (4) aev anaXytical
tcclmi sad theoretical approaches*

. wiz sett cf msemimm a&d n.m'mx%s imt
..', 02
SfiKPLS STQUY
The tljgt&S uere on at 10 r>. a, on June 6, 1361, in ar. i of the
P. .... .. Coopany. Lettering on t;. 8 of this office read: :,L. S. Jon
President. 5
1. There «H lettering on the.
XEi: FALSE?
(This is true beci cifically ami I I lettering <>» £he
door.)
2. ft lioli - la Use office on the evening of Jut*: 01.
TRUE? FAL
(3uiu £g false because the story specifically iflftttlcmn tl. i were
on In the office that eveai.
L. £. Jones is President of the P. . .. Cojapan:.
.
(Ti; iwestion&bie since the story specifies only the lettering on the
door. Mr* Jones, for instance, could he 3 recently.)




(Tu I mdbla. because uaepwdfied. Saaoooc could have turned the
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